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I. INTRODUCTION

In summer 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Clark v. Arizona.'
In Clark, a seventeen-year-old defendant shot and killed police officer
Jeffrey Moritz in Flagstaff, Arizona.2 Moritz had pulled over Clark's truck
in response to a noise complaint call about a pickup truck blaring loud
music in a residential neighborhood. 3 At trial, Clark admitted that he shot
and killed Moritz, but contended that he should be excused from criminal
responsibility because he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.
Specifically, Clark sought to offer psychiatric evidence to support an
insanity-based defense (i.e., that he did not know that what he did was
wrong) and prove that he failed to act with the mens rea required for a
murder conviction because he delusionally thought he was shooting an
alien.4 Relying on Arizona state precedent, the trial court refused to allow
Clark to present evidence of mental illness to rebut mens rea, limiting such
evidence strictly to consideration of his insanity claim.5 The Court held
that Clark failed to prove he was insane by clear and convincing evidence,
as required under Arizona's narrow formulation of the insanity defense.6
Clark was convicted and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of
parole after serving twenty-five years.7 Clark challenged his conviction on
due process grounds,8 but ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
Clark's conviction. 9
The Court's decision has multiple, unfortunate consequences. It has the
practical effect of adding another seriously mentally ill convict to an
already over-burdened prison system that is not designed to cope with such
inmates.'l More significantly, Clark limits the options of mentally ill

1. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
2. Id. at 2716.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2717 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(3) (2005)).
5. Id. (citing State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234
(1997) (refusing "to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent" and holding that
"Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity.., to negate
the mens rea element of a crime")).
6. Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 2717-18 (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(C) (2001)).
7. Id. at2718.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2737.
10. See, e.g., JAMIE FELLNER & SASHA ABRAMSKY, ILL-EQuIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (Human Rights Watch 2003), available at http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2003/usal 003/usa1003.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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criminal defendants and their attorneys in future cases, thereby calling into
question the future of criminal excuse defenses based on mental illness.
Few people, if any, would argue that Clark belongs on the streets. At
issue is whether he belongs in prison or in a secure mental hospital where
he may receive treatment for his schizophrenia. Unfortunately, Clark now
is one of the many severely mentally ill people who will be incarcerated
in an inappropriate venue in which his condition is likely only to
deteriorate. "
Mentally ill criminal offenders often receive inadequate treatment for
their mental dispensation while incarcerated. 2 "The lack of adequate
mental health resources exacerbates existing serious mental conditions for
inmates, resulting in decompensation in inmate mental and physical
health, inmate suicides, and related complications in inmate management
for correctional officials."' 3 Sadly a mentally ill inmate fails to adapt to
life in jail or prison on every measure of psychological adaptation.14
Yet, an indifferent criminal justice system keeps treating mentally ill
criminal offenders as if they were common criminals, a trend that has been
labeled the "criminalization of... mental illness [].,,iS Changes in the law

concerning excuse defenses since the early 1980s have severely curtailed
the ability of people like Clark to be removed from society and properly

11. See generally HEATHER BARR, PRISONS AND JAILS: HOSPITALS OF LAST RESORT (Urban
Justice Center 1999); Alina Perez et al., Reversing the Criminalizationof MentalIllness, 49 CRIME
& DELINQ. 62 (2003); H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons With Severe Mental
Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 483 (1998). Estimates of the
percentage of incarcerated people with serious mental disorders range from a conservative 7.2%
to 20%. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Asylums Behind Bars: A Special Report; Prisons Replace
Hospitalsfor the Nation's Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at Al; T. Howard Stone,
TherapeuticImplications ofIncarcerationfor Personswith Severe Mental Disorders:Searching
for RationalHealth Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 288 (1997) (estimates to upwards of 44% of
certain homicide offenders as serious mental disorders). See Sheilagh Hodgins, Assessing Mental
Disorderin the CriminalJustice System: Feasibility Versus ClinicalAccuracy, 18 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 15, 19 (1995).
12. FELLNER & ABRAMSKY, supra note 10, passim; Earl Stahl & Mary West, Growing
Populationof Mentally Ill Offenders Redefines CorrectionalFacilityDesign, 63 CORRECTIONS
TODAY 72 (2001).
13. Stone, supra note 11, at 285; cf Jarrod S. Steffan & Robert D. Morgan, Meeting the
Needs of Mentally Ill Offenders: Inmate Service Utilization, 67 CORRECTIONS TODAY 38 (2005)
(suggesting ways to better improve care of mentally ill inmates).
14. Stone, supra note 11, at 299 (citing HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, COPING:
MALADAPTATION INPRISONS 42, 50-54 (1989)).
15. See generally Treatment Advocacy Center, FactSheet, CriminalizationofA mericans with
Severe Mental Illnesses, availableat http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact3.pdf (last
visited Sept. 11,2006); Cameron Quanbeck et al., Maniaandthe Law in California:Understanding
the Criminalizationof the Mentally Ill, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1245 (July 2003).
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treated in a rehabilitative setting. The Supreme Court's decision in Clark
is likely to only exacerbate that problem, as the decision condones the
prison punishment of morally blameless actors like Clark.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Clark limited the use
and significance of mental health evidence in courts of law. First, the
Court cast doubt on both mental health diagnostic standards and mental
heath clinicians, stating that evidence concerning psychiatric diagnoses
could "mislead jurors,"' 6 and that mental disease expert testimony had
inherent risks. 17 Moreover, the Court created what dissenting Justices
suspect will be an "evidentiary framework that.., will be unworkable in
many cases."18 Worse yet, the Clark decision will force juries "to decide
guilt in a fictional world with undefined and unexplained behaviors but
without mental illness."' 9
In order to understand the significance of the Clark decision and its
likely impact on the criminal justice system, this Article begins by tracing
the development of criminal excuse defenses based on mental illness.
Specifically, Part II explains the evolution of the insanity defense from
early common law to the present. Part III examines problems and
ambiguities in all formulations of the insanity defense, especially those
problems created by the Clark decision. Part IV explores diminished
capacity, and Part V examines the ways in which diminished capacity has
been expanded to create a variety of pseudo-defenses that have met with
varying degrees of success. Having covered the major criminal excuse
defenses based on mental illness, Part VI examines Arizona v. Clark in
detail. Finally, Part VII concludes with public policy concerns regarding
the future of mental illness based criminal defenses.

II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Common MisperceptionsRegarding the Insanity Defense
In a two-year research study on insanity defense, Professor Michael
Perlin found much evidence to support two propositions regarding public
perceptions of the insanity defense. 2' First, he found that people believed

16. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2734 (2006).
17. Id. at 2735.
18. Id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at2749.
20. Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity
Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit, the Fearof Faking,and the Culture ofPunishment,82 IOWA L.
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the defense was much more widely used than it really is, and second, he
found that public sentiment toward the defense was overwhelmingly
negative:"
According to the news media, the allegedly "popular" insanity
defense is nothing more than a "legalistic slight of hand" and a
"common feature of murder defenses" is viewed as a reward to
mentally disabled defendants for "staying sick," a "travesty," a
"loophole," a "refuge," a "technicality," "one of the absurdities of
state law," perhaps a "monstrous fraud." It is used again, allegedly
in cases involving "mild disorders or a sudden disappointment or
mounting frustrations ... or a less-than-perfect childhood." It is
reflected in "pseudoscience [that] can only obfuscate the issues,"
and is seen as responsible for "burying the traditional JudeoChristian notion of moral responsibility under a tower of
psychobabble."22
In fact, the insanity defense is used quite rarely. It is only raised in
approximately 1% of all felony cases, and when invoked, the insanity
defense is successful less than 25% of the time.23 It is used nearly twice as
much for non-homicide offenses as it is for those offenses involving a
human death. 24 Thus, contrary to popular misperceptions, the insanity
defense is raised infrequently, and even when it is raised, it is unsuccessful
three-quarters of the time.25
There is also much public concern about defendants who fake their

REv. 1375 (1997).
21. Id. at 1380.
22. Id. at 1403 (internal citations omitted).
23. Id.at 1404 (citing Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristicsof Insanity
Defense Pleas:An Eight-State Study, 19 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334 (1991);
Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal
Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 401 (1983)); see also Stuart M Kirschner & Gary J. Galperin,
PsychiatricDefenses in New York County: Pleas andResults, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.

194, 198-200 (2001) (reporting that out of 172 felony defendants raising a psychiatric defense in
a decade in New York City, only 17 juries heard arguments on the insanity defense and, of those,
only 4 resulted in insanity acquittals).
24. Perlin, supra note 20, at 1404 (citing Rodriguez et al., supra note 23, at 402).
25. See Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., Defendants PleadingInsanity:An Analysis of Outcome, 17
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 205 (1989) (reporting that 143 (1.2%) of 11,497
defendants in Baltimore County initially pled insanity, but after forensic evaluation, only 16
defendants (.001%) maintained the plea to the trial stage. Of these 16, the parties stipulated to the
defendants' insanity in 13 cases, leaving only 3 cases contested. One of the 3 cases was dropped,
one resulted in acquittal, and one resulted in a conviction.).
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mental illnesses in order to escape a conviction and who simply hire
clinicians to engage in an expert battle with the prosecution at trial.26
While these cases make for good media play, they are the rare exception
and not the rule. In fact, there is overwhelming agreement on a clinical
diagnosis between clinicians on both sides of the criminal dispute. One
7
study put the clinician agreement rate at 88%;

another at 92%.28

Moreover, the media and Hollywood exacerbate the fears of a defendant
feigning mental illness to avoid criminal punishment. However, such fears
are ill-founded.29 In practice, modem diagnostic instruments and
procedures allow clinicians to distinguish correctly those who are truly
mentally ill and those who are faking between 92% and 95% of the time."
Thus, when defendants fake mental illness, it is extraordinarily difficult for
them to "get away with" it.
B. Evolution of the Insanity Defense
1. The Wild Beast Defense
The insanity defense has a long history, having roots in Moslem,
Hebrew, and Roman law.3 Justice Tracy, a thirteenth-century judge in
King Edward's court, first formulated the foundation of an insanity defense
when he:32

26. Perlin, supra note 20, at 1404.
27. Id. at 1405 (citing Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded?,
141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885, 885-86 (1984)).
28. Id.(citing Kenneth Fukunaga et al., Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and
Concordance ofPsychiatric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325,326 (1981));
cf Daniel C. Murrie & Janet I Warren, Clinician Variation in Rates of Legal Sanity Opinions:
Implicationsfor Self-Monitoring, 36 PROF. PSYCHOL., RES., & PRAC. 519-24 (2005) (reviewing
clinician agreement rates on determinations of legal insanity).
29. Recent carefully-crafted empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that malingering
among insanity defendants is, and traditionally has been, statistically low." Perlin, supra note 20,
at 1410 (citing Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of Malingerers
Diagnosedby ExperiencedForensicPsychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 380-81 (1989)
(discussing a study in which "clinicians diagnosed 8% of criminal defendants as malingering
psychotic symptoms"); Linda S. Grossman & Orest E. Wasyliw, A Psychometric Study of
Stereotypes: Assessment of Malingering in a Criminal Forensic Group, 52 J. PERSONAL.
ASSESSMENT 549, 549 (1988) (finding a minority of defendants clearly malingered)).
30. Id. (citing David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery to Detect
PrisonInmates Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation,8 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 75, 75 (1990)).
31. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 65-66 (1984).
32. Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology ofInsanity Defense
Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 645 (1990) (citing Rex v. Arnold, Y.B. 10 Geo. 1
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[i]nstructed the jury that it should acquit by reason of insanity if it
found the defendant to be a madman which he described as "a man
that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth
not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or
a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment."33
Justice Tracy's wild beast test "set the standard which would be applied
in English courts throughout the eighteenth century."3 4 There are few
records about how the wild beast test was actually applied, but
"commentators of the period consistently spoke of a requirement that the
defendant lack understanding of good and evil or be devoid of all reason,
and often equated the insane with animals or infants."35 Interestingly, there
was no separate or special verdict that excused a defendant on the basis of
his insanity. Rather, after conviction, an appeal was made to the king for
a pardon.36
The defense evolved significantly in 1800 when James Hadfield shot
King George I, because he believed he had acted on orders from God.3 7
At his trial for treason, defense counsel argued that Hadfield's delusions,
stemming from head trauma suffered during battle, caused his actions.38
Several physicians offered testimony corroborating Hadfield's head trauma

(1724), reprintedin 16 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 695 (Thomas Bayly Howell
ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1812)).
33. Id.at 632 n. 142; see also RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
17 (1967). Perlin goes on to explain that the word "brute" as used in Arnold's case referred to "farm
animals such as 'badgers, foxes, deer, and rabbits.'[] Thus, the emphasis was apparently meant to
focus on a lack of intellectual ability, rather than the savage beast-like image the phrase calls to
mind." Perlin, supra note 32, at 632 n.142 (emphasis added).
34. Anne C. Gresham, The Insanity Plea: A Futile Defense for Serial Killers, 17 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (1993) (citing SIMON, supra note 33, at 18-19).
35. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1208 (2000). Slobogin states: "In medieval times, the
insanity finding was implemented not through a formal verdict after judicial instructions, but via
pardon from the king. There are several accounts of pardons before the sixteenth century, but the
precise grounds for these actions are not clear." Id. at 1208 n.32.
36. Id.(quoting THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 (1985) ("There was no need for tests of exculpatory insanity because the
only criteria for a pardon were those dictated by the king's opinion and conscience.")).
37. Gerald Robin, The Evolution of the Insanity Defense, 13 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 224,
226 (1997).
38. Id. at 226.
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claims.39 The jury acquitted Hadfield because "the prisoner appear[ed] to
be under the influence of insanity at the time the act was committed."4'
The Hadfield case represented a departure from the wild beast test in
two ways. First, "it rejected the argument that the defendant 'must be
totally deprived of all mental faculty before acquitt[al].'" 4 Second, it was
the first time that a verdict of not guilty by reasons of insanity (NGBI)
"became a separate verdict of acquittal. 42 However, within a few years of
the Hadfield decision, English jurisprudence reverted to using Justice
Tracy's wild beast test, which did require a near complete deprivation of
mental faculties for an acquittal.43
2. The M'Naghten Test
In 1843, the M'Naghten case' set forth a legal standard for insanity
that many U.S. jurisdictions still use today.45 M'Naghten was indicted for
the first-degree murder of Edward Drummond, the secretary to the English
Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel.46 M'Naghten had intended to kill Peel, but
mistook Drummond for him. 47 He explained to the police that he wanted
to kill the Prime Minister "because the Tories in my city follow and
persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed my peace of
mind. They do everything in their power to harass and persecute me; in
fact, they wish to murder me. 48
At M'Naghten's trial, his defense attorneys argued that he suffered
from paranoid persecutory delusions. 49 To support this defense,
"[M'Naghten] had the assistance of four of the most able barristers in
39. Id.
40. Id.; see generally Richard Moran, The OriginofInsanityas a Special Verdict: The Trial
for Treason of James Hadfield, 19 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 487 (1985).
41. Gresham, supranote 34, at 194 (quoting SIMON, supra note 33, at 19).
42. Robin, supra note 37, at 226 (citing B. Caesar, The InsanityDefense: The New Loophole,
16 PROSECUTOR 19 (1982)).
43. Gresham, supranote 34, at 194 (citing SIMON, supranote 33, at 19).
44. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). There are at least twelve different spellings
of M'Naghten's last name, something that he himself likely contributed to since he spelled his own
name differently on several occasions. RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE
INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL M'NAGHTEN xi (1981).

45. Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline: State Insanity Defense Laws (2005), available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/states.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
46. Robin, supra note 37, at 226.
47. Id.
48. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 969 (5th ed. 1989) (citing MORAN, supranote 44, at 90).
49. See Robin, supra note 37, at 226 (citing JOHN BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 97 (1955)).
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Britain and nine prominent medical experts. 50 In contrast, the prosecution
put on no experts. Lord Chief Justice Tindal charged the jury as follows:
The question to be determined is whether at the time of the act in
question was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of his
understanding, so as to know that he was doing a wrong or wicked
act. If the jurors should be of opinion that the prisoner was not
sensible at the time he committed it, that he was not violating the
laws of both God and man, then he would be entitled to a verdict in
his favor; but if, on the contrary, they were of opinion that when he
committed the act he was in a sound state of mind, then their
verdict must be against him. 5
The jury found M'Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity.5"
M'Naghten was committed to Bedlam, the notorious asylum, where he
lived until his death.53 Much public outrage over the acquittal followed,
including condemnation of the case from Queen Victoria, who herself had
been the target of assassination attempts.54 The House of Lords
subsequently enacted what became known as the M'Naghten test for
insanity.55
Under M'Naghten, the defense must clearly prove that, at the time the
defendant committed the act, he or she was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
what he was doing was wrong.5 6 In comparison, the M'Naghten test states
that:
1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
of the offense;
2) the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect;
3) that caused the defendant either:

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supranote 48, at 969 n.20 (citing MORAN, supranote 44, at 90).

M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718, quotedin KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 48, at 969.
Robin, supra note 37, at 226.
Id.
Id. (citing BIGGS, supra note 49, at 97).
See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
Id. at 722.
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(a) not to know the nature and quality of the act he or she
committed; or
(b) knowing the quality or nature of the act, nonetheless not to
know that the act was wrong.57
The first M'Naghten test element illustrates that the insanity defense
is not concerned with a defendant's mental state at the time of trial, but
rather with the defendant's state of mind at the time the criminal act is
alleged to have taken place. The second element requires that the
defendant suffer from a "mental disease or defect.""8 The third part of the
test concerns the legal doctrine of causation.
The doctrine of causation applicable in criminal law requires two
distinct types of causation: cause-in-fact and proximate cause.59 The
M'Naghten test is concerned with the former. Cause-in-fact is what we
normally think of as "causing": if a person does some act that directly
brings about a particular result, then the person is said to have caused the
result.6" In other words, would the result have occurred "but for" the
defendant's conduct? If the result would not have occurred but for the
defendant's conduct, then the defendant's conduct is the cause-in-fact of
the result.6 '
It is important to legal causation and insanity interplay. The relevant
question concerning causation for insanity purposes is: "But for the mental
disease or defect, would the criminal act have occurred? 6 2 If the answer
to that question is "yes," then the mental illness was not the cause-in-fact
of the crime; only if the answer to the question is "no" is there causation
for insanity purposes. In conducting this inquiry, courts "make no
distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' causes of
behavior.... "63 Thus, "even if one assumes that a person's behavior is
'caused' by unconscious beliefs, the environment, or some other factor,

57. See id.
58. Id. What constitutes a mental disease or defect for the purposes of the insanity defense
is a somewhat complicated matter that will be addressed in Part III of this Article.
59. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1963).
60. Id. cmt. 258 ("The Code thus poses an initial factual inquiry, asking whether the conduct
of the defendant is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.").
61. For an excellent discussion of causation in criminal law, see Eric A. Johnson, Criminal
Liabilityfor Loss of a Chance, 91 lowA L. REv. 59, 66-71 (2005).
62. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
63. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION FOR THE COURTS 122 (1987).

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 18

that person is nonetheless 'responsible' for his or her behavior" unless the
specific legal requirements of the insanity defense are met.'
Under the M'Naghten test, the mental disease or defect that existed at
the time of the offense, must have caused one of two things: cognitive
incapacity-the inability to know the nature and quality of the act
committed, or moral incapacity--the inability to know that the act
committed was wrong.65 The cognitive incapacity part of the test relieves
the defendant of liability when the defendant is incapable of forming mens
rea. For example, if a man strangled another person believing that he was
squeezing the juice out of a lemon, he did not understand the nature and
quality of his act.66 Finding cognitive incapacity is rare because it requires
that a person suffer from a psychotic disorder of such severity so as to be
removed from reality and not know what he or she is doing.67 For example,
in McNaghten, the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act. He
wanted to kill the Prime Minister and attempted to do so. He was,
therefore, not cognitively incapacitated under the first prong of this
formulation of the insanity test.
The second part of the M'Naghten test-the moral incapacity to
distinguish right from wrong-is usually at the crux of an insanity
defense.68 This part of the insanity test relieves a defendant from criminal
liability, even if the person forms the requisite mens rea (as M'Naghten
formed intent to kill), as long as the actor does not understand that his act,
even though committed with specific intent, is wrong.6 9
3. Shortcomings of the Cognitive Focus of the M'Naghten Test
For years, scholars criticized the M'Naghtentest because it only looked
at the cognitive and moral aspects of the defendant's actions.7' The test

64. Id.
65. These terms for the two prongs of the M'Naghten test were not widely accepted when
Clark was decided. In addition, there are currently no articles using these terms in relation to the
prongs of M'Naghten. Yet, these are the terms the Supreme Court elected to use in Clark, even
though the Court had never before used these terms. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2719
(2006).
66. Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied:Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 253, 261 (1999).
67. Id.at261.
68. Id.at 261-62.
69. Id.at 261; see also M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
70. When I teach criminal law, I illustrate the distinction between pure cognitive knowledge
of something and an understanding of that same thing using Einstein's classic equation E=MC2 .
Nearly all students have heard of the equation and most know that it represents: energy = mass
multiplied by the speed of light, squared. Few, however, understand the equation well enough to
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had no element that evaluated the volition of the defendant.7 M'Naghten's
focus on the cognitive, to the full exclusion of the affective and volitional
elements of human behavior, failed to consider "that mentally ill offenders
might be aware that their behavior is wrong, yet nonetheless be
emotionally unable to restrain themselves or control their conduct."72
Thus, to many scholars and practitioners of the mental health sciences, the
test was incomplete and "scientifically outdated."73
Practitioners and scholars also criticized the M'Naghten test for being
too rigid. "Even if one accepts the premise that cognitive dysfunction is the
only appropriate focus of the insanity defense, the M'Naghten [test] ... did
not fairly pose the question. . . . '[I]f the test language were taken
seriously ... it would excuse only those totally deteriorated, drooling
hopeless psychotics of long-standing and congenital idiots.' 74
Finally, scholars criticized the M'Naghten test for its focus on "right"
and "wrong," a standard that often required clinicians to make moral
judgments about defendants.75 These problems with the M'Naghten test
led to the development of other formulations of the insanity defense that
included an affective component.
4. The Short-Lived Durham Rule
Dissatisfied with the M'Naghten test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit formulated a new insanity test in Durham v.
United States.76 In Durham, the Court held that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental
disease or defect., 7 7 This finding came to be known as the "Durham
Product Test" or the "Durham Rule."

explain what it means or how it can be applied. Thus, they have cognitive knowledge, but not true
understanding.
71. See, e.g., Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927,937 (3d Cir. 1978) (Adams,
J., dissenting); see also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (rejecting
M'Naghten test), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
72. Robin, supra note 37, at 227.
73. JOSUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 321 (2d ed. 1995).
74. MELTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 116 (quoting GREGORY ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE,
& MAN 273 (1943)).
75. Durham,214 F.2d at 862 (rejecting M'Naghten test), overruled by Brawner,471 F.2d at
981; see also Robin, supra note 37, at 228.
76. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75, overruled by Brawner,471 F.2d at 981.
77. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75.
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While the Durham rule did away with both the cognitive focus and
moral judgments embedded in the M'Naghten test, it proved to be an
unworkable standard. The rule led to an "influx" of expert witnesses
whose testimony largely narrowed the jury's role as fact-finders.7"
Additionally, the number of criminal acquittals on the basis of the Durham
rule rose. 9 While this increase was not necessarily problematic in and of
itself, some viewed it as having had the effect of abolishing the notion of
insanity as a limited excuse. In place of the traditional limited insanity
defense, Durham appears to have judicially legislated a rule that excused
all mentally ill persons from criminal responsibility, regardless of either
the type or degree of impairment.8 " The Durham rule was eventually
overruled by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1972 in United States v.
Brawner,1 which adopted a formulation of the insanity defense based on
the standards suggested by the American Law Institute (AL) in its 1962
Model Penal Code.
5. The ALIIMPC Affective Test
The ALI, a prestigious, non-partisan group of judges, lawyers, and
scholars from both law and related disciplines, developed a Model Penal
Code (MPC) in 1962. Its formulation of the insanity defense is usually
referred to as the ALI/MPC Affective test and provides that "a person is

78. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY
1998); see also Robin, supra note 37, at 229.

AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

297 (4th ed.

Psychiatric witnesses were prone to testify in conclusory terms that the defendant
was or was not suffering from a mental disease and that the criminal act was or
was not the product of the illness. By doing so, expert witnesses were essentially
deciding the ultimate issue of the defendant's criminal responsibility ....
Robin, supra note 37, at 229.
79. SIMON, supranote 33, at 203 (reporting a 0.24% success rate for the insanity defense at
trials in Washington, D.C., in the four years preceding Durham,and a 2.29% rate at trials in the six
years following Durham); RIcHARD ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE 17 (1974) (reporting 0.4% success
rate for the insanity defense in trials in Washington, D.C., in 1954, the year proceeding Durham,
and a 7.2% success rate in the twelve years following the Durham decision).
80. See, e.g., Frigillana v. United States, 307 F.2d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("If our
objective is to excuse all mentally or emotionally disturbed persons from criminal responsibility
we should frankly and honestly say that and proceed accordingly, for that is precisely where our
rule, as applied, is taking us."). See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal
Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 373 (1955) (stating that the Durham Rule constituted "a
legal principle beclouded by a central ambiguity, both unexplained and unsupported by its basic
rationale").
81. Brawner,471 F.2d at 981.
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not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such conduct as of
a result of a mental disease or defect, [the defendant] lacks the substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."812 Although the ALI/MPC formulation
of the insanity defense did not define what a mental disease or defect 3 was
(just as the M'Naghten test failed to do), it did include a provision that
purposefully excluded those who were suffering from antisocial
personality disorder from being considered to have a mental disease or
defect.8 4 For the sake of being able to make element by element
comparisons among the various formulations of the insanity defense, the
ALI/MPC Affective test can be expressed in this way:
1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
of the offense;

82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
83. The primary tool used in the United States for defining mental disorders is the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA).
The DSM was first created by the APA in 1952. Since then, it has gone through five major
revisions: DSM-1I (1968), DSM-III (1980), DSM-III revised edition (1987), DSM-IV (1994), and
its most current edition published in 2000. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDER (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
84. According to the DSM-IV-TR, antisocial personality disorder is a:
[P]ervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three or more of the following: (1)failure to
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest; (2) deceitfulness, as
indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit
or pleasure; (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; (4) irritability and
aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults; (5) reckless
disregard for safety of self or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated
by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations; and (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
Id. at 687, 702-06. The person being diagnosed with this disorder must be at least eighteen years
of age, and, prior to age fifteen, must have exhibited evidence of a conduct disorder such as
aggression to people and animals (bullying, threatening, initiating fights, using a weapon, robbery,
forcing sexual activity); destruction ofproperty (including by fire); deceitfulness or theft (including
breaking & entering, shoplifting); and serious rule violations (truancy or running away). Id. at 706.
Finally, to qualify for the diagnosis, the person cannot have exhibited such behaviors exclusively
during an active psychosis, such as one prompted by schizophrenia or a manic episode. Id.
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2) the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect (other
than antisocial personality disorder and/or any other
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct);
3) that caused the defendant to lack either:
(a) the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his or her conduct; or
(b) the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.85
The first two elements of the ALI/MPC Affective test are the same as
those required under the M'Naghten test. Both look at the defendant's
conduct at the time of the offense, and both require a mental disease or
defect. However, a slight difference in the mental disease or defect
requirement between the M'Naghten test and the ALI/MPC formulation
of the insanity defense is that the latter specifically excludes antisocial
personality disorder.86
The principal difference between the two formulations is in the third
element. As discussed earlier, the M'Naghten test focused on the cognitive
aspects of behavior: did the defendant know what he or she was doing, and
if so, did the defendant know it was wrong? It was an all or nothing
standard that required total (or near total) impairment. The ALI/MPC
formulation avoided a purely cognitive focus by adding a volitional
element. Further, the ALI/MPC test replaced the M'Naghten test's focus
on pure cognitive knowledge of the wrongfulness of one's acts with a less
stringent test requiring that the defendant lack the "substantial capacity to
appreciate" the wrongfulness of his actions.8" As a result, mental health
experts and ultimately, juries, were permitted to "consider the defendant's
moral, emotional, and legal awareness of the consequences of his or her
behavior . . . [in recognition that] there are gradations of criminal

responsibility and that the defendant need not be totally impaired to be
absolved of such responsibility."88
Additionally, the ALI/MPC test was less strict than the M'Naghten test
since it allowed even those who knew and appreciated that their acts were

85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
86. See supra text accompanying note 85.
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).

88. Robin, supra note 37, at 230 (citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (1966)).
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wrong to assert the insanity defense by claiming they were unable to abide
by the law. This aspect is known as the "irresistible impulse test."89 The
ALI/MPC formulation of the insanity defense sought to implement the
irresistible impulse test nationwide in response to its recognition that the
evolving state of behavioral science knowledge clearly acknowledged that
one's volition was often impacted by mental illness.9" Thus, with the
implementation of the ALI/MPC insanity test, "defendants' inability to
control their actions [became] an independent criterion for insanity."91
The ALI/MPC formulation of the insanity defense was repeatedly
criticized by scholars, lawyers, and psychiatrists for the inclusion of the
irresistible impulse test.92 These critics argued that an irresistible impulse
was really just an impulse that was not, in fact, resisted.93 For example,
would a criminal defendant have committed the crime if a policeman had
been next to him? Since the answer to this hypothetical question in all
likelihood would be "no," it suggests that the impulse was not truly
irresistible, but rather one that was simply not resisted. Moreover,
allowing volitional impairment to qualify as the basis of a defense of
excuse is inconsistent "with a criminal justice system premised on free
will."94 In spite of the criticisms, a majority of the states and all but

89. The irresistible impulse test excused "a defendant whose mental illness 'so subverts his
will as to destroy his free agency by rendering him powerless to resist by reason of the duress of
the disease."' Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent
UnitedStates Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1484 (2006)

(quoting Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887)). Largely as a result of the inflexible nature
of the M'Naghten test, the irresistible impulse test had become a part of the insanity defense
formulations of seventeen states by the 1920s. Slobogin, supra note 35, at 1212 n.41 (citing
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 241-42 n. I (1967)).

90. Robin, supranote 37, at 230.
91. WRIGHTSMANETAL., supra note 78, at 298.
92. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1600
(1994) (distinguishing an "impulse" from a bona-fide "compulsion," thereby criticizing the notion
of an irresistible impulse). Even the American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric
Association joined in this criticism of the volitional aspect of the ALL/MPC test. MELTON ET AL.,
supra note 63, at 117 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, standard 7-6.1, at 329-32 (1984); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, STATEMENT ON THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 12 (1982)).

93. Id. at 1599-1602; see also, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Responsibilityand the Unconscious,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1665 (1980) (distinguishing causation of behavior from compulsion).
94. Christopher Slobogin, The InteractionistAlternativeto the InsanityDefense: Reflections
on the ExculpatoryScope of MentalIllness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial, 30 AM. J. CRIM.

L. 315, 320 (2003).
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one federal circuit95 eventually adopted the ALI/MPC formulation of the
insanity defense.96
6. The John Hinckley Case
In the late 1970s, John Hinckley, an obsessed fan of Jodie Foster, made
several attempts to woo Foster while she was a first-year student at Yale
University. 97 When Foster rebuffed his overtures, Hinckley decided he
needed to do something that would make an impression on her-some
"historic deed [that would] finally gain her respect and love for him." 98 On
March 30, 1981, he carried out his plan by attempting to assassinate thenPresident Ronald Reagan as he was leaving the Washington Hilton Hotel
in Washington, D.C.9 9
At his trial for attempted murder, Hinckley asserted the insanity
defense; the ALL/MPC formulation of the insanity defense governed his
trial.' 00 In response to the defense raising the insanity defense, the
government had to prove that Hinckley was sane beyond a reasonable
doubt at the time he made his assassination attempt on President
Reagan.' 0
"After weeks of conflicting testimony by defense and prosecution
psychiatrists-testimony that struck some as an affront to common
sense-the jury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity."'0 2 At least
for some jurors, the ALIIMPC formulation of the insanity defense
determined the outcome of the case. One juror reported feeling "trapped"
by the test: "My conscience had me voting one way, but the law would not
allow me to vote that way."'0 3 Hinckley's acquittal using the insanity
defense sparked a furor over the defense and focused critical, national

95. Robin, supra note 37, at 231 (citing United States v. Tomiero, 735 F.2d 725 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1995)).
96. ld; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 117.
97. PETER W. Low, JR. ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 23-24 (1986). Hinckley sent Foster love letters, poems, and had two "awkward"
phone conversations with her. Id.at 25.
98. Id.at 32.
99. Id.at 27.
100. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981).
101. Robin, supra note 37, at 231.
102. Id.(quoting Insane on All Counts: Is the System Guilty?, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26-27);
see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley ClearedBut Is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1982, at Al, D27.
103. Robin, supra note 37, at 231 (quoting Walter Isaacson, Insane on All Counts: Is the
System Guilty?, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26).
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attention on it."° "Within days [of the verdict], the most 'celebrated'
insanity trial in American history had instantly become the most
'outrageous' verdict."' 5
In the wake of the Hinckley verdict, the insanity defense underwent
sweeping reforms in both the federal system and in many states. 10 6 After
twenty-six different pieces of legislation were introduced in Congress to
either abolish or restrict the insanity defense at the federal level,0 7
Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA).° 8 In
doing so, Congress codified the federal insanity defense for the first time
and legislatively overruled the application of the ALI/MPC insanity test
in all federal cases. 10 9
7. The Provisions of the IDRA
A defense based on IDRA will prevail if: "At the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as of a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense."" 0
Again, it is helpful to consider the requirements of IDRA in terms of
its specific elements:
1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
of acts constituting the offense;

104. George L. Blau & Richard A. Pasewark, Statutory Changes and the Insanity Defense:
Seeking the Perfect Insane Person, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 69, 70 n.6 (1994) (citing Valerie P.
Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public's Verdict, 47 PUB.
OPINION Q. 202, 203 (1983); Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, "Plain Crazy": Lay Definitions of
Legal Insanity, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 105 (1984); Nightline: Insanity Plea on Trial (ABC
television broadcast June 22, 1982); Otto F. Wahl, Post-Hinckley Views ofthe Insanity Defense,
8 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 3, 5-7 (1990)).
105. Perlin, supra note 32, at 637.
106. See, e.g., Lisa A. Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States PostHinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 54-59 (1987).
107. Michael L. Perlin, The Things We Do For Love: John Hinckley's Trial and the Future
of the Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts (Book Review), 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857, 860
(1985).
108. Pub. L. No. 91-190,98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)).
109. Perlin, supra note 32, at 638; Brian E. Elkins, Idaho's Repeal of the Insanity Defense:
What Are We Trying to Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 151, 155 (1994).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
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2) the defendant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect
3) that caused the defendant to be unable to appreciate either:
(a) the nature and quality of his or her acts; or
(b) the wrongfulness of his or her acts."'
In effect, IDRA returns the law of insanity to where it was at the time
the M'Naghten test was adopted. Like the previous insanity defense
formulations, the first element looks at the mental state of the defendant
at the time of the commission of the offense." 2 The second element, just
like M'Naghten test and the ALIMPC formulation of the insanity defense,
requires a mental disease or defect." 3 But IDRA added the requirement
that the mental disease or defect be severe." 4 This requirement of severity
effectively limited the applicability of the defense to people suffering from
psychoses and mental retardation, thereby effectively eliminating neurosis,
disabilities, and personality disorders as predicate mental diseases or
defects.' '
The third element is similar to all prior formulations of the insanity
defense insofar as there must be a causal nexus between the mental illness
and the crime committed. 16 However, the third element changed the
insanity defense as it existed in the federal courts quite significantly in two
important ways. First, the third element effectively abolished the volitional
aspect of the ALIIMPC insanity defense as expressed in the irresistible
impulse test. Thus, under IDRA, an inability to conform one's conduct to
the requirements of the law no longer qualifies as the basis of an insanity
defense. Second, the third element effectively reinstated the M'Naghten
test with a slight modification. Instead of requiring a lack of "knowledge"
that one's conduct is wrong to qualify as legally insane, IDRA requires an
inability to "appreciate" the wrongfulness of one's conduct." 7 This leaves

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
"severe"

See id.
Seeid.
Seeid.
See id.
See infra Part III.A; see also Perlin, supra note 32, at 639 n.175 (stating that the word
was added as a qualifier "to ensure that relatively minor disorders such as nonpsychotic
behavior disorders or personality defects would not provide the basis for an insanity defense")
(citing HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 AND OTHER CRIMINAL
STATUTES ENACTED BY THE 98TH CONGRESS 59 (1984)).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
117. See id.
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the slightest door open for the defense to introduce some affective
component, rather than having to focus exclusively on the defendant's
cognitive incapacities.
In addition to changing the elements of the insanity defense and
standardizing the defense for the federal system, IDRA also made a critical
procedural change in how the way the insanity defense is litigated. Up
until the time of DRA, once the defense announced its intention to use the
insanity defense (i.e., once the defense met its burden of production), the
prosecution bore the burden of persuasion to prove that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant was legally sane at the time of a criminal
offense. "' But IDRA shifted both the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion to the defense by making insanity an affirmative defense. "9
Accordingly, the defense must now prove that the defendant was insane
at the time of the criminal offense by clear and convincing evidence. 20
Whether this shift in the burden of proof has had a significant impact on
case outcomes is questionable in light of the few studies that have failed
to demonstrate "any consistent relationship
between the imposition of the
11
burden of proof and the acquittal rate.''
Finally, IDRA triggered a change to the law of evidence. With regard
to expert witnesses:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or
of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.' 22
However, at least two studies using simulated trials have demonstrated
that this change in the law of evidence regarding
the "ultimate issue" has
2
had no significant effects on jury verdicts. 1
By 1985, thirty-three states had followed the lead of Congress and reevaluated the insanity defense as it applied in their respective state
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Renee Melangon, Note, Arizona'sInsaneResponse to Insanity,40 ARiz. L. REv. 287,297

(1998) (citing MELTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 202).

122. FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
123. See Richard Rogers et al., Effects of Ultimate Opinions on JurorPerceptionsof Insanity,
13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 225, 230 (1990); Solomon M. Fulero & Norman J. Finkel, Barring
Ultimate Issue Testimony: An "Insane" Rule? 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 495, 504 (1991).
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jurisdictions.124 Many states followed IDRA and made insanity an
affirmative defense, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion from the
prosecution to the defense to prove the defendant's insanity, usually by a
preponderance of the evidence.'25 Other states left the burden of
persuasion with the government to show the defendant's sanity, but
tightened the substantive test for insanity by requiring a severe mental
disease or defect or some equivalent. 21 6 Twelve states replaced the insanity
defense with some variant of the "guilty, but mentally ill" verdict. 27 Four
states-Utah, Montana,
Idaho, and Kansas-abolished the insanity
28
defense altogether.1
C. Alternative Verdicts for Defendants Claiming Mental Illness
1. Michigan's "Guilty But Mentally I1l" Verdict
Some states provide juries with a number of verdicts to consider in
cases that rely on insanity defenses. For example, in August 1975,
Michigan was the first U.S. state to supplement its NGBI verdict by
adding another verdict alternative termed "guilty but mentally ill"
(GBMI). 129 The impetus for enacting the new verdict came largely from
the case of John Bernard McGee. 30 McGee was found NGBI at his murder
trial and was committed to a mental institution.'3 ' While institutionalized,
he admitted to twenty-five additional killings.3 2 Two months later, in a
civil commitment hearing mandated for NGBI acquittees by an unrelated
Michigan Supreme Court case,'33 McGee was found "not presently insane"
and was released. 3 4 He again was arrested one month later for beating his
wife to death.'35 Public outcry led the state legislature to adopt the GBMI

124. Callahan et al., supra note 106, at 54-56.
125. Id; see also Melangon, supra note 121, at 297.
126. Callahan et al., supra note 106, at 54-56.
127. Id.
128. The abolition of the insanity defense is discussed infra Part III.G.
129. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(1) (1992) (enacted Aug. 6, 1975).
130. Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both
Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity
Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 973-74 (1987).
131. Id. at 973 (citing Brown & Wittner, CriminalLaw, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 335, 355 (1979)
(included in annual survey of Michigan law)).
132. Id.
133. See People v. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
134. Mickenberg, supra note 130, at 973.
135. Id.
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verdict in an effort to "to reduce the number of successful [NGBI] pleas
and insure lengthy confinement for those defendants who are found
insane. 136
Under the Michigan GBMI law, a jury would return a verdict of GBMI
if the following three criteria were found beyond a reasonable doubt: "(a)
That the defendant is guilty of an offense[;] (b) That the defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense[; and] (c) That the
defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.' 37 This verdict was, in effect, a "compromise.' 38 It allowed
juries to acquit those defendants who were clearly insane under a
traditional NGBI verdict while also giving jurors a "middle ground"
verdict to convict those who were not clearly insane, but who did suffer
from a mental illness at the time of the commission of a criminal offense.
Under the Michigan GBMI scheme, a defendant so adjudicated would
be sentenced just as if he or she had been found guilty of the crime, with
one exception: a court must make a determination if the GBMI defendant
needs treatment.139 If a court finds the defendant does need treatment, then
the defendant would be remanded into the custody of either the department
of corrections
or the state's department of mental health services for
40
treatment.
Other states followed Michigan's lead and adopted the GMBI
verdict. 14' This movement was largely in response to NGBI verdicts in
those states that brought public outcry over the insanity defense, especially
after the successful "Twinkie Defense" of Dan White in 1979142-a version

136. Id. at 974.
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(1) (1992) (enacted Aug. 6, 1975) (emphasis added).
138. Perlin, supra note 32, at 1379.
139. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 768.36(1), (2) (1992) (enacted Aug. 6, 1975).
140. Id. § 768.36(3). Interestingly after treatment, the defendant must serve whatever time
remains on his or her sentence in a correctional facility. Id. However, the law provides that a judge
can order the remainder of the term to be served on probation if the defendant continues with
mandatory mental health treatment. Id. § 768.36(4).
141.

HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY

DEFENSE REFORM 38 (1993); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 401(b), 408 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1985); ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, act. 5,
tit. II, art. 6 (West 1990); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.120
(LexisNexis 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-312 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (LexisNexis
1984 & Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-14 (1988).
142. White killed San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and fellow City Supervisor Harvey
Milk. His trial for two counts of first-degree murder resulted only in convictions for voluntary
manslaughter after the jury ostensibly found White, a hypoglycemic, to have suffered from
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of diminished capacity discussed later in this Article.143 In most of the
jurisdictions that adopted the GBMI verdict, all three elements (i.e., the
defendant (1) is guilty of the offense charged; (2) was mentally ill at the
time of the commission of the offense; and (3) was not legally insane at
the time of the commission of the offense) must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by the government.44
The very phrase "guilty, but mentally ill" is an oxymoron. It allows
jurors to affix guilt, while simultaneously allowing a finding of excuse for
that guilt. The contradiction of a lack of moral blameworthiness due to
mental illness, coupled with a.determination of factual guilt, should be
intellectually irreconcilable. But supporters argue that it has a two-fold
benefit: it allows jurors to feel better about returning NGBI verdicts when
someone is truly mentally ill, and conversely, it allows jurors to convict
those who are mentally ill, but not insane, while still recognizing mental
45
illness as a contributing factor that mitigates the need for punishment. 1
The GBMI verdict received much criticism from scholars.' 46 Notably,
empirical research demonstrated that the verdict had little if any effect on
the NGBI adjudication rate. For example, Smith and Hall found that NGBI
acquittals represented .026% of all arrests before the GBMI law went into
effect and .024% of all arrests in the six years after the new verdict was
available. 47 They concluded the new GBMI verdict "merely substituted
a new name for certain defendants who, in148the absence of the new statute,
probably would have been found guilty.'
Moreover, one of the primary objectives of the GBMI verdict was to
get treatment for those defendants who, although mentally ill, did not have
their cognitive abilities so impaired as to be rendered legally insane. In
reality, however, "GBMI prisoners are treated like any other prisoners;
diminished capacity during a sugar and caffeine induced reactive psychosis, brought about by a
combination of depression and having gorged himself on Twinkies and Coca-Cola. See generally
KENNETH W. SALTER, THE TRIAL OF DAN WHITE (1991).
143. See infraPart IV.
144. See supra text accompanying note 141. Some states, however, require only that the
prosecution prove the first element-the guilt of the defendant-beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(B) (2006). Then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
he or she was mentally ill at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Lewis, 494 S.E.2d 115, 117 (S.C. 1997).
145. Mickenberg, supra note 130, at 988-89.
146. See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 (1985) (summarizing and analyzing
critiques of the GBMI verdict).
147. Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, EvaluatingMichigan'sGuilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:
An EmpiricalStudy, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77, 107 (1982).
148. Id. at 80.
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they will get extra treatment if they need it, but that's the same treatment
[the prison will] give everyone else."' 49 In fact, Smith and Hall reported
that 75% of GBMI defendants in Michigan received no psychiatric
treatment at all, usually due to financial constraints. 5 ° Of all the states
using a GBMI verdict, only Alaska, Kentucky, and South Carolina actually
guarantee treatment. 5 ' But whether treatment in these three states is any
more effective than in the others is quite questionable. The chair of the
Parole Board in Kentucky stated, "From psychological evaluations and
treatment summaries, the Board can detect no differences in treatment or
GBMI] from those who have been
outcome for [inmates adjudicated
52
adjudicated as simply 'guilty."9
2. Guilty Except Insane
Not all states structured their variations on the GBMI verdict. Consider
Arizona's approach-the one upheld in Clark v. Arizona.153 Under it, a
person may be found "guilty except insane" (GED if:
1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act,
2) the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such
severity,
3) that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong.
4) A mental disease or defect constituting legal insanity is an
affirmative defense. The defendant shall prove the defendant's
legal insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
5) Mental disease or defect does not include disorders that result
from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or
drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders, or impulse
control disorders. Conditions that do not constitute legal

149. Mickenberg, supra note 130, at 993-94 (citing Smith & Hall,supranote 147, at 105 n. 138
(quoting Dr. John Prelesnick, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center at Michigan's
Jackson State Penitentiary)).
150. Id. at 994 (citing Smith & Hall, supranote 147, at 105 n.137).
151. For two excellent critiques of the GBMI verdict, see generally Mark A. Woodmansee,
Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: PoliticalExpediency at the Expense of Moral Principle,
10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341 (1996); Slobogin, supranote 146.
152. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 309.
153. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

insanity include but are not limited to momentary, temporary
conditions arising from the pressure of the circumstances, moral
decadence, depravity, or passion growing out of anger, jealousy,
revenge, hatred or other motives in a person who does not suffer
from a mental disease or defect or an abnormality that is
manifested only by criminal conduct.'54
The GEl verdict abolished the NGBI verdict in its entirety. It holds the
person responsible (i.e., "guilty"), but simultaneously exempts the legally
insane (under the narrow definition set forth in the statute) from criminal
punishment. But, as at least one critic of the statute has said, "the 'guilty
but insane verdict' is a contradiction in terms .... [O]ne cannot be both
guilty from a legal standpoint and insane from a legal standpoint."' 55 This
conflict aside, the statute is one of the most restrictive insanity-related
statutes in the United States in some aspects, while being arguably the
most progressive in other ways.
Arizona's statute returns to the M'Naghten test's concept of defining
insanity as not knowing right from wrong. As a result, it suffers from the
same criticisms levied against the M'Naghten test for its exclusive focus
on cognitive aspects of thought and behavior to the exclusion of affective
elements.' 56 But Arizona's GEl statute is more restrictive than both the
M'Naghten test and the modem federal variation of the old M'Naghten test
for two reasons.
First, like the modem federal formulation of the insanity defense under
the IDRA, a "severe" mental disease or defect is required.' 57 Also, like the
modem federal formulation of the insanity defense, Arizona's GEl statute
makes the defense an affirmative one, placing the burden of persuasion on
the defendant to prove his or her insanity by clear and convincing
evidence.' 58 But, unlike previous formulations of the insanity defense,
Arizona's formulation contains the most restrictive exclusions of mental
disorders from qualifying as a "mental disease or defect" for insanity
purposes. These restrictions range from antisocial personality disorder,
psychosexual disorders, and impulse control disorders, to "disorders that
result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or
drugs, character defects, . .. momentary, temporary conditions arising

154. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (1997). Although the statute itself is not broken into
elements, it is presented above in enumerated elements for comparative purposes.
155. Melanron, supra note 121, at 313.
156. See supra Part I.C.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
158. Id.
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from the pressure of the circumstances, moral decadence, depravity, or
passion growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other
motives." ' 9
The second major change to the traditional M'Naghten test under the
Arizona law is the elimination of the cognitive incapacity prong of the test
(i.e., not knowing the nature and quality of one's acts) from the definition
of legal insanity. The omission of this prong narrows the M'Naghten test's
definition of insanity. This change appears to be one merely in form over
substance since the first part of the M'Naghten test was the much more
stringent part of the test. 60 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
overlap between the two prongs of the M'Naghtentest in Arizona v. Clark,
noting that "[i]n practical terms, if a defendant did not know what he was
doing when he acted, he could not have known that he was performing the
wrongful act charged as a crime.' 16' Thus, while slightly more restrictive
than the M'Naghten test, Arizona's narrowing of the test for insanity may
be of little practical consequence.
While Arizona's GEl approach seems harsher than the GMBI approach
taken by other states, the treatment of the offender after a GEl verdict is
actually more humane than in other jurisdictions. In Arizona, a defendant
found GEI of a crime involving a death or physical injury does not go to
a correctional institution, but rather enters the custody of a state-run
mental health facility. 62 The person remains confined until it is shown by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she no longer suffers from the
mental disease or defect. However, a conditional release is available if the
person is still mentally ill, but the illness is under control and the person
poses no danger to his or herself or to others.1 63 Additionally, if the
person's crime did not involve a death or physical injury, then a court must
release the person upon a judicial determination that he or she poses no
risk of danger to himself and herself or to others. 1" On the other hand, if
there is a risk of dangerousness, then civil commitment proceedings are
instituted along with their strict due process supervision requirements.

159. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(A) (1997). For a critique of many of these restrictions,
see Melangon, supra note 121, at 306-12 (including a discussion of the potential convictions of
those suffering from brief reactive psychoses under the statute).
160. See, e.g., MELTON ETAL., supra note 63, at 123 ("[p]resumably, an accused who does not

meet the first test [under M'Naghten] will not meet the second."). But cf.Melangon, supranote 121,
at 305-06 (arguing that the omission of the first part of the M'Naghten test could lead to absurd
results).
161. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2722 (2006).
162. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(A) (1997).
163. Id.§ 13-3994(F).
164. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3994(B)-(C) (1997).
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These post-verdict procedures are among the most progressive in the
United States. Arizona's statute is clearly designed to ensure that those
who need mental health care actually get it-quite a different result than
appears to occur in GBMI jurisdictions. Equally important, the length of
any period of detention in the mental health facility is not tied to any
potential criminal sentence, but rather to the person's recovery. Finally,
someone adjudicated GEl does not serve any time in a correctional
institution, even if a fast recovery is made. Thus, although the law labels
someone "guilty," its aim is clearly not to punish someone who is insane
under its quirky definition of insanity, a fact further demonstrated by the
provision of the law which states, "A guilty except insane verdict is not a
criminal conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes [for future
crimes, if any]... "165
3. Abolition of the Insanity Defense: The Mens Rea Approach
Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas have no insanity defense 66 and
allow the introduction of mental illness evidence only to show that the

165. Id. § 13-502(E).
166. The constitutionality of a state abolishing the insanity defense was first challenged in
Montana. See State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 994 (Mont. 1984). In Korell, the Montana Supreme
Court rejected the challenge, relying primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Leland v.
Oregon. Id. at 1000 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). The Court in Leland upheld
an Oregon statute requiring the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Leland, 343
U.S. at 798-99. TheLelandCourt reasoned this was constitutionally permissible because the burden
to prove the requisite mens rea remained with the prosecution. Id. at 799; see also In Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element constituting the crime charged). Relying on this holding, the Korell court upheld the
abolition of the insanity defense since the state still had to prove the state of mind element of the
underlying criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Korell, 690 P.2d at 1000. It should be noted
that empirical research has shown that the abolition of the insanity defense resulted in a
"statistically significant increase in the number of defendants found permanently incompetent to
stand trial." Perlin, supra note 20, at 1423 n.316 (citing Rita Buitendorp, A StatutoryLesson from
"Big Sky Country" on Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 965, 993-96 (1996)
(discussing the research reported in Henry J. Steadman et al., Maintenance ofan InsanityDefense
Under Montana's "Abolition" of the Insanity Defense, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 357, 359-60
(1989)). The highest courts of Idaho, Utah, and Kansas all reached similar conclusions. See State
v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003); State v. Herrera,
895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). But see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001) (striking down Nevada's
legislative abolition of the insanity defense on due process grounds).
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level of mens rea the state is required to prove as an element of a crime
was not possessed by the defendant due to his or her mental condition.' 67
Normally, the insanity defense would apply to the same types of cases
as the mens rea approach. However, the technicalities of a true insanity
defense function quite differently than the mens rea approach when
dealing with a delusional defendant. For example, suppose a defendant
killed another person because he delusionally believed that God had
ordered him to kill that person. Under a traditional insanity defense, the
psychosis responsible for such a delusionary belief system would likely
excuse the defendant's criminal act because the defendant did not know
that what he did was wrong if he believed he was doing God's will.'68 But
under the mens rea approach, the defendant could be convicted of
premeditated murder since he acted purposefully when killing his victim.
The fact that a serious mental illness was responsible for forming the
defendant's specific intent to kill would be irrelevant for determining his
guilt. It would, however, be relevant in sentencing. 6 9
D. Post-Verdict Consequences of Not Guilty by Reason ofInsanity
The public bases its primary criticism of the insanity defense on the
misperception that people found NGBI go free. Such is not the case. For
example, John Hinckley was acquitted and institutionalized via a NGBI
verdict in 1981.170 Twenty-six years later, he is still housed at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital in their wing for the criminally insane."' If Teddy
Roosevelt's attempted assassin, who served thirty-one years in a mental
Hinckley is likely to be at St.
hospital, serves as any indicator, John
172
Elizabeth's for many years to come.

167. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); see also
Raymond L. Spring, Farewellto Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea, J.KAN. B. Ass'N, May 1997, at
38, 39; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-101, 102, 103 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1986).
168. See, e.g., Andrew J. Demko, Note, Abraham's Deific Defense: Problems with Insanity,
Faith, andKnowingRightfrom Wrong, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1961 (2005); Grant H. Morris &
Ansar Haroun, "God Told Me to Kill": Religion or Delusion?,38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001).
169. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1)(b) (2006) ("Mental illness is not otherwise a
defense, but may be evidence in mitigation of the penalty in a capital felony... and may be
evidence of special mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or attempted criminal
homicide ....).
170. Robin, supra note 37, at 231.
171. Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution "MedicallyAppropriate"?,31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 15, 57-58 n. 188 (2005).
172. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL, supranote 78, at 304.
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John Hinckley's lengthy post-acquittal confinement is the rule, not the
exception. 73
' Most states automatically commit someone found NGBI for
at least a sixty-day period and then place the burden on the person
committed to show when they are no longer mentally ill and dangerous. 74
'
The overwhelming number of people found NGBI are confined in mental
hospitals for years beyond what they would have served in prison had they
been criminally convicted. For example, in New York and California,
defendants found NGBI
serve more than double the average length of
175
incarceration.
criminal
States differ markedly on how long an insanity acquittee may be
incarcerated.1 76 Some states limit the period of confinement in a mental
health facility to no longer than the maximum potential sentence would
have been if the defendant had been convicted of the offense. 177 But other
179
7
states impose an indefinite period of treatment 1 of "one day to life."'
Under this standard, the defendant who is committed as mentally ill and
posing a risk of danger to himself or to others remains committed in that
mental institution until he or she is no longer mentally ill or no longer
dangerous. 8 ° Normally, state law presumes a person so committed

173. Only a minority of states do not automatically commit someone to a mental facility upon
a NGBI verdict. New Jersey's statute is representative of this minority approach, which requires
that a defendant first go through psychiatric examination and thereafter, requires the Court to
determine whether the defendant ought be committed. See N.J.S. 2C:4-8 (1996) (Supp. 2005).
174. MELTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 113.
175. Grant H. Morris, Placedin Purgatory: ConditionalRelease of Insanity Acquittees, 39
ARIZ. L. REv. 1061, 1063 (1997) (citing Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment? Comparing the
Lengths of Confinement of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 375, 382-85 (1995); Grant T. Harris et al., Length of Detention in Matched Groups of
InsanityAcquittees and ConvictedOffenders, 14 INT'LJ.L. &PSYCHIATRY 223,225,234 (1991)).
176. See generally Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Reconsidering the Consequence of an Insanity
Acquittal, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIr.CONFINEMENT 3 (2005).
177. See Maura Caffrey, A New Approach to InsanityAcquittee Recidivism: Redefining the
Class of Truly Responsible Recidivists, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 423 n. 127 (2005) (citing RALPH
REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 842 (4th

ed. 2004).
178. Caffrey, supranote 177, at 423 n. 127 ("The length of... commitment will not depend
on the severity of the crime ... committed. Rather, it will rest on ... continuing illness and
dangerousness.").
179. See, e.g., Jessica Butterfield, Blue Mourning: PostpartumPsychosis and the Criminal
Insanity Defense, Waking to the Reality of Women Who Kill Their Children,39 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 515,531 n. 111 (2006) (citing Christopher Slobogin, Symposium on the ABA Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not
Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494, 500 (1985)).
180. Id.
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remains both mentally ill and dangerous and places the burden of proving
otherwise on the person committed.''
E. Summary of the State of the Insanity Defense
Whether the changes that occurred in the aftermath of Hinckley have
had any significant impact on the rate of acquittals on the basis of insanity
is questionable. Empirical research on the actual effects of IDRA is
woefully lacking. However, it would appear that the changes in the law
have had little impact from the few studies conducted examining this
issue.
One study by Norman J. Finkel that compared the rate of insanity
acquittals in California under the ALI/MPC formulation of the insanity
defense to the rate following the state's return to the M'Naghten test after
the Hinckley case found the acquittal rate to have remained relatively
constant before and after the legislative change.8 2 Finkel used an
experimental design in which undergraduate students were presented with
scripts whereby five female defendants, each with a unique diagnosis, had
been charged with a homicide and pled insanity in her defense. He found
that the particular version of the insanity defense that the evaluating
students were told to apply did not significantly alter the proportion of
defendants determined to be insane in each diagnostic category.'83 In a
simulated trial study, researcher James R.P. Ogloff altered not only the
actual insanity test used as an experimental condition, but also the level of
proof required and the side bearing the burden of persuasion.' Ogloff
found no significant differences for the acquittal rate among the
experimental conditions.8 5 On the other hand, in contrast to those studies
examining acquittal rates, at least one study found that the post-Hinckley

181. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 357 (1983) (upholding the continued
confinement of a man who was acquitted on insanity grounds of the misdemeanor charge of petty
larceny beyond the one-year maximum period of time he could have served had he been convicted
by holding commitment may be for as long as necessary to treat the mental illness). But cf Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,77-78 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that allowed
confinement of insanity-acquitted defendants who were no longer mentally ill solely on the basis
of their dangerousness to society).
182. Margaret A. McGreevy et al., The Negligible Effects ofCalifornia's1982 Reform of the
Insanity Defense, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 744, 745-47 (1991).
183. Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: Much Ado About Nothing,
7 BEHAV. SC. & L. 403 (1989).
184. James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on JurorDecision
Making, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509 (1991).
185. Id.
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statutory changes to the insanity defense in Georgia and New York
resulted in fewer defendants entering insanity pleas in both jurisdictions.'86
The lack of empirical evidence to support the proposition that IDRA
and state changes modeled after it, either in whole or in part, have actually
had an effect on the incidence and success rates of the insanity defense is
not surprising for a few reasons. First, "generally, in the absence of either
exceptionally persuasive or 'objective' evidence, jurors reject the notion
that an alleged mental disorder is severe enough to excuse criminal
behavior.' ' 187 Thus, regardless of the actual formulation of the insanity
defense, juries tend to view the defense with skepticism.
Second, when faced with evidence of insanity, it appears jurors use
their own views or constructs of what insanity is, such as:
[P]erceptions of the defendant's incapacity, awareness, clarity of
thinking, ability to control behavior, capability of evil motive, and
whether any other person or persons were at fault for the criminal
act . . . Essentially, jurors resort[] to their own common sense
definition of insanity, one that seem[s] much more complex than
the simplistic conceptualization of the insane person embodied in
the major rules.' 8
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, jurors bring "their own personal
sense ofjustice" to their insanity defense deliberations including "attitudes
about the morality of the insanity defense and the punishment of mentally
ill offenders."' 89 If so, perhaps there are crimes so heinous that it offends
one's sense of justice to the point where one cannot excuse criminal
responsibility even in the face of strong evidence of insanity. Consider the
sensational criminal prosecutions of Jack Ruby, Sirhan Sirhan, John
Colin Ferguson, and John
Wayne Gacy, Jeffery Dahmer, Charles Manson,
90
convicted.
were
all
insanity;
pled
Salvi. All

186. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 141.

187. Perlin, supra note 32, at 721 (citing Richard Arens et al., Jurors,Jury Charges and
Insanity, 14 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1965); STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 141, at 44 (finding that
severe psychosis "almost became a prerequisite for success")).
188. Blau & Pasewark, supra note 104, at 85; see also WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 78,
at 298-99.
189. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 298-99; see also Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L.
Golding, The Social Constructionof CriminalResponsibility andInsanity,15 LAW& HUM. BEHAV.

349, 359-360 (1991); Norman J. Finkel, De FactoDeparturesfrom InsanityInstructions, 14 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 105 (1990).
190. For interesting explorations of the particular problems with proving insanity in
postpartum depression cases, see Jessica Butterfield, Comment, Blue Mourning: Postpartum
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One scholar in discussing Jeffery Dahmer's case wrote that the careful
manner in which Dahmer killed his victims so as to reduce his chances of
being caught must have left the jury unconvinced that he suffered from a
mental disease or defect sufficiently severe to rise to the level of
insanity.' 9' "This cautiousness suggested that he appreciated the
wrongfulness of his behavior and could control it when it was opportune
for him to do so.' 9 2 While this explanation of Dahmer's conviction is
plausible, it is equally plausible that the jury found what Dahmer did to be
so heinous that they refused to acquit him using one of the most liberal of
all the formulations of the insanity defense, the one that included the
irresistible impulse test. Consider one commentator's summary of
Dahmer:
[A]ssuming that there might be degrees of insanity, I do not find it
hard to accept that a jury might distinguish between Dahmer and
Gacy. Gacy was an otherwise industrious, capable businessman,
who carefully prepared in advance to commit numerous murders in
secrecy, successfully hiding the bodies and his crimes for years. On
the other hand, Dahmer was a maladjusted weirdo who drilled holes
in the heads of his living victims for his own scientific purposes,
killed a man after police responded to his apartment building and
confronted him and his naked and bleeding victim, kept body parts
in his closet and refrigerator for extended periods of time, and
cannibalized his victims.' 93
Keep in mind, for comparison purposes, that John Hinckley was
acquitted after being found insane under the same formal test for insanity
that was rejected in Dahmer. The resulting harm in the two cases,
however, was quite different. Although John Hinckley tried to kill the
President, he did not succeed. His trial was, therefore, one of attempted
murder. In contrast, Dahmer killed and dismembered fifteen victims, often94
had sex with their corpses, and in some cases, ate parts of their bodies.
Psychosis and the CriminalInsanity Defense, Waking to the Reality of Women Who Kill Their
Children, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 515 (2006); Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond
Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for
PostpartumPsychotic Women, 93 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713 (2003).
191. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 299.
192. Id.
193. William J. Kunkle, Jr., Counter-Point:Gacy v. Dahmer: An Informed Response, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV.331, 335 (1997).
194. Maureen O'Donnell, Jury Hears of Dahmer'sGruesome Past, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 5,
1992, at 5.
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In spite of the bizarre behaviors exhibited by Dahmer, he was convicted.
But if Jeffery Dahmer was not insane, then who is?
Ill. AMBIGUITIES AND PROBLEMS WITH THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A. What is a "Mental Disease or Defect"?
1. Generally
What constitutes a mental disease or defect for the purposes of the
insanity defense? Unfortunately, the question is difficult to answer. Rarely
is there an answer to this question that turns on a pure matter of law.
Courts have consistently refused to precisely define the term "mental
disease or defect." Instead, they have held that the issue of whether a
person is suffering from a mental disease is a question of fact to be
decided at trial. 9
When deciding the factual question of which mental illnesses will
qualify as the basis for an insanity plea, courts reluctantly guide
themselves by the medical categories of mental illnesses as defined by the
psychiatric community in the DSM-IV-TR. 9 6 However, it is clear that
courts do not rely on medical labels exclusively. "[W]hat definition of
'mental disease or defect' is to be employed by courts enforcing the
criminal law is, in the final analysis, a question of legal, moral and
policy-not of medical-judgment."'9 7 While the law does not recognize
every psychiatric condition in the DSM as a qualifying mental disease or
defect for insanity defense purposes, it does usually require the condition
being offered as a qualifying mental disease or defect at trial to be

195. United States v. Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891
(1994); United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Steil, 916 F.2d
485, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smeaton, 762 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1985).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1509, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993) (taking judicial
notice that a condition listed in the DSM is a recognized psychiatric condition); United States v.
Johnson, 979 F.2d 396,401 (6th Cir. 1992) (takingjudicial notice of an earlier edition ofthe DSM).
'197. United States v. Murdoch, 98 F.3d 472,478 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1122
(1997) (quoting United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930
(1984)).
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recognized in DSM.198 However, without a bona fide psychiatric diagnosis,
courts rarely allow defendants to plead insane.'99
A literal reading of the insanity defense would mean that any "mental
disease or defect" would qualify. 20 Such a reading, however, is not
warranted, as neither courts nor clinicians read the insanity defense
literally.2 ' For one thing, "courts and juries pay more attention to the
degree of impairment than to the specific mental disability suffered by the
defendant., 20 2 In support of this proposition, Melton et al. cite to the
overwhelming number of successful insanity defenses involving one of
only two types "of mental conditions: psychosis and mental retardation. 2 3
Bruce Winick, one of the foremost scholars on the intersection of law
and mental health, suggests that courts view mental diseases and defects
with "a traditional medical model of illness," one that may be limited to
conditions that until recently were labeled psychoses. These major mental
disorders, schizophrenia, major depressive disorders, and bipolar disorder,
seem to be the paradigmatic cases of mental illness., 2°4 In support of the
proposition that the modem conceptualization of mental illness involves
psychoses, Winick cites the American Psychiatric Association's American
PsychiatricGlossarywhich defines a psychosis as follows:

198. Judith E. Macfarlane, Neonaticideand the "Ethosof Maternity": TraditionalCriminal
Law Defenses and the Novel Syndrome, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 239 (1998) ("[T]he
requirement that there be medical recognition of the disorder 'lends the necessary credibility to this
objectively unconfirmable claim ofabnormality.' The presence of the 'abnormality' in the DSM-IV
as an authoritative source for mental disorders may help to satisfy the disability requirement in all
insanity formulations.") (internal citations omitted).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Tomiero, 570 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1983), af'd,735 F.2d
725 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1995) (refusing to recognize compulsive gambling
disorder as a qualifying mental disease or defect). See also Murdoch, 98 F.3d at 472, in which the
concurringjudge specifically explained his reliance on the DSM as not being "in contradiction with
the position ... that the definition of mental disease or defect is a matter of legal and not medical
judgment," but rather was necessary because "the law must ultimately be applied to the facts, but
the facts can only be determined by trying to understand what evaluating doctors [see] when...
examin[ing defendant-patients]. Those observations [are] recorded in the diagnosis which can only
be understood through reference to the DSM." Id. at 479 n.5.
200. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("[A] mental
disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental
or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.").
201. See MELTON ET AL., supranote 63, at 123.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Bruce Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1
PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 558-59 (1995).
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A major mental disorderof organic or emotional origin in which
a person's ability to think, respond emotionally, remember,
communicate, interpret reality, and behave appropriately is
sufficiently impaired so as to interfere grossly with the capacity to
meet the ordinary demands of life. Often characterized by
regressive behavior, inappropriate mood, diminished impulse
control, and such abnormal mental content as delusions and
hallucinations.The term is applicable to conditions having a wide
range of severity and duration. See also schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder,
depression, organic mental disorder, and reality
20 5
testing.

While there can be no doubt that courts accept psychoses as "mental
diseases or defects," it is important to keep in mind that the existence of
a psychosis is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish legal
incompetency or insanity. 206 Other criteria, notably the psychosis being the
legal cause of the defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong,
must also be satisfied.20 7
Courts rarely have problems determining how true psychoses fit within
the frameworks of the varying forms of the insanity defense. The more
problematic situation for courts is deciding if other psychiatric disorders
qualify as a "mental disease or defect" for insanity purposes. Perhaps the
most challenging of these other diagnoses are the personality disorders.
2. Personality Disorders
Some federal circuit courts of appeals have specifically held that
personality disorders are not "mental diseases or defects" within the
meaning of the insanity defense. 0 8 Other federal circuit courts have

205. Id. n. 102 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRICASS'N, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 139
(6th ed. 1988)). For a neuro-psychological critique of the criminal law's narrowing of insanity, see
Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787 (2004) (arguing that damage to the prefrontal cortex should
qualify as a mental disease or defect for insanity defense purposes even when no psychotic
symptoms are present).
206. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

AND THE LAW 218, 221 (3d ed. 1991).
207. For interesting explorations of how Deific commands (i.e., orders from "God") play into
understanding right from wrong, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
208. See United States v. Bilyk, 29 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a severe
antisocial personality disorder is not evidence of present mental illness); United States v. Prescott,
920 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a fmding of no mental disease or defect where experts
testified that a personality disorder was not considered a mental disease or defect in the mental
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determined that although personality disorders are mental diseases or
defects, they are not "severe enough" under the modem federal
formulation of the insanity defense to serve as the basis for an insanity
defense.2 °9 It appears that at least one federal circuit (the Ninth) refuses to
adopt a rule covering personality disorders as a class of psychiatric
diagnoses, considering instead the specific diagnosis on a case-by-case
basis.21 °
There is a similar split of authority at the state level regarding whether
personality disorders qualify as mental diseases or defects for insanity
defense purposes. At least two states exclude personality disorders from
the definition of mental disease or defect entirely.21' Other states exclude
only certain types of personality disorders, most notably antisocial
personality disorder.2 1 2 On the other hand, some states have very broad
definitions of mental illnesses for purposes of an insanity defense. For

health community).
209. See generally United States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that
non-psychotic behaviors or neuroses are not severe mental diseases or defects); United States v.
Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251 (7th Cir. 1996).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Murdoch, 98 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1122 (1997) (upholding a district court determination that a "Personality Disorder, Not
Otherwise Specified with Narcissistic and Passive-Aggressive traits" constituted a "mental disease
or defect" sufficient to qualify as the basis of an insanity defense and continued incarceration in a
mental hospital). In fact, the concurring judge in Murdoch wrote:
Although I agree that mere personality quirks or characteristics cannot be
construed as mental diseases or defects for purposes of determining legal sanity,
I conclude that a personality disorder such as that suffered by Appellant is much
more than a mere quirk. It is a systemic, enduring, and severe condition resulting
in an extremely abnormal perception of and reaction to everyday events. In short,
Appellant's condition is so encompassing and impairing that it rises to the level
of a disease or defect.
Id. at 479 (Wilson, J., concurring).
211. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (1997).
212. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-501 502 (West
1997) (distinguishing mental "disorders" from "character and personality disorders characterized
by lifelong and deeply ingrained antisocial behavior patterns, including sexual behaviors which are
abnormal and prohibited by statute unless the behavior results from a mental disorder"); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. § 394.455(18) (2006) (excluding "conditions
manifested only by antisocial behavior or drug addiction" from the definition of mental disease or
defect); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (1997);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(A) (West 1992) (defining "mental illness" as "a substantial
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 1997).
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example, the Alaska law seemingly encompasses all personality
disorders." 3 Kentucky specifically excludes antisocial personality
disorder,2" 4 but appears to allow all other types of personality disorders to
qualify as the basis of an insanity defense.215
As mentioned above, both the federal system and that of several states
refuse to consider antisocial personality disorder as a qualifying mental
disease or defect for the purposes of the insanity defense. Prior to the third
edition of the DSM, people suffering from antisocial personality disorder
were called sociopaths, psychopaths, or moral imbeciles. 1 6 Winick
suggests there are three issues concerning the diagnosis which might
justify the law's refusal to treat it as a mental disease or defect. First, he
reasons that antisocial personality disorder is "exclusively behavioral in
nature, involving certain behavioral manifestations and personality
traits."2 7 Second, unlike psychoses, antisocial personality disorder does
not appear "to be biochemical in etiology."" 8 And third, the disorder is not
treatable in any predictable way.21
Using these same three criteria, Winick also explains why other
personality disorders once labeled neuroses, as well as impulse control
disorders like kleptomania, pyromania, and sexual disorders known as
paraphilias (pedophilia and frotteurism), also do not appear to be mental
diseases or defects for insanity purposes.22 While Winick's explanations
for why these non-psychotic disorders are not mental diseases or defects
for insanity purposes are debatable, they are well-reasoned and consistent
with logic, precedent, and clinical evidence.

213. Murdoch, 98 F.3d at 479 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.130(3) ("[M]ental disease or
defect means a disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs judgment, behavior, capacity
to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.")).
214. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020(2) (West 2005) ("As used in this chapter, the term
'mental illness or retardation' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise antisocial conduct.").
215. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.060(6) (West 2005) (defining "mental illness" as
"substantially impaired capacity to use self-control,judgment, or discretion in the conduct of one's
affairs and social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or recognized emotional
symptoms where impaired capacity, maladaptive behavior, or emotional symptoms can be related
to physiological, psychological, or social factors").
216. Winick, supra note 204, at 566.
217. Id. at 560.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.at 573-74.
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3. Alcohol and Drug Addiction
The DSM-IV-TR classifies alcoholism and numerous drug addictions
as Axis I "substance related disorders." '' Involuntary intoxication on
drugs or alcohol was a complete defense to a crime at common law and
continues to be in most U.S. jurisdictions today.222 Voluntary intoxication,
however, has never been a complete defense under the criminal law. 223 At
common law, voluntary intoxication was a partial defense that mitigated
a crime of specific intent down to one of general intent if the defendant
was so intoxicated that he or she could not form specific intent.2 24 Today,
some jurisdictions still follow this old common law approach, while other
jurisdictions
have abolished the defense of voluntary intoxication
225
entirely.
However, separate and apart from the criminal defense of intoxication
are two issues regarding intoxication and insanity that continue to divide
U.S. courts. The first is whether an addiction to drugs or alcohol can
qualify as a mental disease or defect for the purposes of an insanity
defense.226 The second is whether a drug or alcohol induced psychosis
(when unaccompanied by some other mental illness) is a qualifying mental
disease or defect for an insanity defense. 227 The overwhelming number of
U.S. jurisdictions answer both questions in the negative even though
psychiatry recognizes a host of substance abuse disorders as mental
illnesses in the DSM. 228 This is even true for addictions that result from
medical treatment.
Alcohol and drug addiction is not a mental illness for insanity defense
purposes for several reasons, but the primary justification is the
voluntariness of the person's addiction.229 People cannot choose to not be
schizophrenic. But people can choose whether they will drink or take

221. See DSM-IV-TR, supranote 83, at 16-19, 192.
222. Meghan Paulk Ingle, Law on the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses Are Being EightySixed, 55 VAND. L. REv. 607, 616 (2002) ("[T]he involuntary intoxication defense enjoyed early
recognition in Anglo-American common law.... Currently, American courts generally recognize
the defense when the defendant's intoxication is the result of coercion, fraud, an unexpected effect
from prescription medication, or 'pathological intoxication."').
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., People v. Bieber, 856 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1993).
227. Id. at 815-16.
228. Id. at817.
229. Id. at 816 (stating that the defendant's settled insanity "resulted from his use of
amphetamines and, as such, may be regarded [as voluntary, self-induced] intoxication .... "
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drugs. Biological predispositions to alcoholism and addiction aside, the
law takes the view that one should seek treatment for an illness he brought
upon himself, not seek excuse from the harm he has caused by failing to
control his own behavior.23
4. Summary of the Meaning of Mental Illness
Three generalizations can be made that might help make clear the
insanity defense mental disease or defect requirement. First, neither
intoxication nor addiction to drugs or alcohol, without more, constitutes
" ' Second,
a "mental disease or defect" for insanity defense purposes.23
DSM Axis I clinical disorders (i.e., "psychoses") nearly always qualify as
bona fide mental diseases or defects for the purposes of the insanity
defense.232 Third, DSM Axis II personality disorders rarely qualify as bona
fide mental diseases or defects for insanity purposes unless the etiology of
the given personality disorder can be fit into the medical model of
deviance (i.e., it is not purely behavioral in nature; it has some organic
cause, and is treatable in some predicable fashion).233 The reason for this
distinction appears to be "a desire to guard against turning every
personality quirk into a 'mental
disease or defect' through the imprimatur
234
of a psychiatric category.
B. What is "Wrong"?
What is right, just, good, moral, and so on is a question that has
perplexed philosophers for eons. The counter-question, what is bad,
wrong, or immoral, is not much easier to answer. 235 The law, however,
often avoids complex philosophical issues and leaves it to scholars to
debate. 236 It certainly does so in defining what is meant by "wrong" for the
purposes of the insanity defense, which requires that a mental disease or

230. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930
(1984).
231. See supra Part III.A.3.
232. See supra Part III.A.1.
233. See supra Part III.A.2.
234. United States v. Murdoch, 98 F.3d 472, 479 (9" Cir. 1996 (citing CriminalProcedure:
InsanityPlea-InadmissibleMentalConditions,26 PAC. L.J. 254,255 (1995)). For a more detailed
analysis of this issue, see Ralph Slovenko, The Meaning of Mental Illness in Criminal
Responsibility, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1984).
235. See generally Robert J. Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment, 40 U. FLA. L.
REV. 17 (1988) (exploring moral philosophy as it applies to criminal punishment and excuse).
236. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convictingthe MorallyBlameless:Reassessingthe Relationship
Between Legal and MoralAccountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992).
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defect render a defendant unable to "know right from wrong" or to
"appreciate the wrongfulness" of his or her acts.237 The law simply looks
at whether the defendant knew the act was wrong by societal standards.
Imagine the consequences if one could argue that as a Satanic worshiper,
it is not wrong to kill, but rather offering human sacrifice is required under
the tenets of that religion.238 To avoid the possibility of a defendant
succeeding with such an argument, jurors aim to use an objective societal
standard of right and wrong.
IV. INTRODUCTION TO DIMINISHED CAPACITY

The insanity defense is one way the law operates to relieve criminal
responsibility from those who, as a result of mental illness, do not act with
true moral culpability. But there are significant restrictions on the
availability of the insanity defense. Consider people who are mentally ill,
but not "severely" enough to qualify as legally insane under IDRA and its
progeny. Alternatively, consider people who are severely mentally ill, but
still knew both the nature and quality of their acts and the difference
between right and wrong. Although the law generally does not recognize
such conditions as qualifying for a total excuse defense, defendants with
such impairments may not be as culpable as those who are not mentally ill.
For such persons, the doctrine of diminished capacity might be available
to mitigate their criminal responsibility, their sentence, or in some
circumstances, even excuse their criminal responsibility altogether.
A. Attempting a Definition of Diminished Capacity
Unfortunately, there is no standard definition for the doctrine of
diminished capacity. The doctrine exists, either statutorily or in case law,
in more than half of all U.S. jurisdictions. 239 Although diminished capacity
is often referred to as a defense, doing so is somewhat inappropriate. As
commentators have often pointed out, it is not a defense at all, but rather
deals with the admissibility of evidence concerning the accused's mental

237. Id.passim.
238. See State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (upholding a first-degree murder
conviction of a man who claimed he was insane when he killed his wife, who he believed was
having an affair, since his religion allowed such a killing).
239. Lucy Noble Inman, Mental Impairmentand Mens Rea: North CarolinaRecognizes the
Diminished CapacityDefense in State v. Shank and State v. Rose, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1293, 1308-09
(1989).
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state. 240 It is most frequently invoked in first degree murder cases to negate
premeditation.241
Although there are clearly "differing views regarding the meaning and
application of the diminished capacity concept," the favored view of
diminished capacity is that it is "a type of evidence.. . admitted to rebut
the specific intent required to convict the defendant of the crime
charged., 242 In other words, a defendant invoking the diminished capacity
doctrine asserts that his or her mental state prevented him or her from
forming the requisite mens rea for the crime. Without proof of the required
mens rea element, the defendant should not be convicted of that crime.243
But the use of diminished capacity evidence to negate the existence of
mens rea "is not an affirmative defense and does not result in an acquittal
unless there is a failure to establish intent for the offense and for all of its
lesser included counterparts. 244 The burden of persuasion to prove intent
remains with the prosecution when a defendant argues diminished
capacity; 241 the defendant only needs to create a reasonable doubt with
regard to state of mind in order to be acquitted. 246 Accordingly, diminished
capacity is not only easier to use, but is also much "more likely to succeed
than the insanity defense. '"247
The term diminished capacity is often used to encompass the related
concept of diminished responsibility, but they are technically distinct
concepts in the criminal law. Diminished responsibility is concerned not
with capacity to form intent, but rather the propriety of punishment.248
Diminished responsibility allows either a jury or a judge "'to mitigate the

240. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, UndiminishedConfusion in DiminishedCapacity,75 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,44 (1984) (explaining that diminished capacity is usually not a true defense
in its own right); Gayle Cohen, Johnson v. State-DiminishedCapacity Rejected as a Criminal
Defense, 42 MD. L. REV. 522 (1983).
241. Inman, supra note 239, at 1293.
242. Chesney E. Falk, Comment, CriminalLaw-State v. Phipps: The Tennessee Court of
CriminalAppeals Accepts "DiminishedCapacity" Evidence to Negate Mens Rea, 26 U. MEM. L.
REV. 373, 383 (1995).
243. Inman, supra note 239, at 1298.
244. State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citing United States v.
Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988)).
245. Id. at 143.
246. Id.; see also J. Thomas Sullivan, The Culpability, or Mens Rea, "Defense" in Arkansas,
53 ARK. L. REV. 805, 816 (2000) (stating that diminished capacity actually serves as a means for
rebutting the prosecution's proof on the essential element of the culpable mental state, rather than
as an independent rationale either justifying or excusing the accused's behavior).
247. Inman, supra note 239, at 1299.
248. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, DiminishedRationality,DiminishedResponsibility, 1 OHIo
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003).
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punishment of a mentally disabled but sane offender in any case where the
jury believes that the defendant is less culpable than his normal
counterpart who commits the same criminal act.' 249 Diminished
responsibility has not been embraced by the courts of the United States,
but has been in England. ° However, ten U.S. jurisdictions, the Model
Penal Code, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow for the
admission of mental abnormality evidence in sentence mitigation.25 '
B. Applying Diminished Capacity
Jurisdictions that recognize diminished capacity vary greatly in the
ways in which they permit the doctrine to be used. Some jurisdictions
restrict the use of diminished capacity evidence to specific intent crimes.252
Other states further limit its use to cases where evidence of diminished
capacity might negate the specific intent requirement for murder only. 3
Still other jurisdictions have adopted the MPC's approach, which allows
diminished capacity evidence in any case where the defendant's mental
state is at issue. 254 The Model Penal Code approach has been endorsed by
the American Bar Association, 255 and is the one most frequently followed
256
in the United States in those states recognizing diminished capacity.
Before the defense may introduce any evidence of diminished capacity,
the defendant must meet a burden of production by providing sufficient
evidence of a mental disease or defect that would causally interfere with
249. Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY
L.J. 9,26 n.66 (1982) (quoting Peter Arenella, DiminishedCapacityandDiminishedResponsibility
Defenses: Two Children ofa Doomed Marriage,77 COLUM. L. REv. 827, 828-29 (1977)).
250. Jennifer Kunk Compton, Note, Expert Witness Testimony and the DiminishedCapacity
Defense, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 386-87 (1997).
251. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (1980); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
5K2.13 (1998); see also Deborah E. Dezelan, Departuresfrom the FederalSentencing Guidelines
after Koon v. United States: MoreDiscretion,Less Direction,72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1679, 168889 (1997) (recognizing diminished capacity as a mitigating factor to punishment).
252. Inman, supra note 239, at 1309 (citing Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); State v. Holcomb, 643 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)).
253. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Garcia, 479A.2d473 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Gould,
405 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1980)).
254. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-803 (2006) (evidence of mental impairment
admissible to negate mental element of any offense). Section 4.02(1) of the Model Penal Code
reads: "[E]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible
whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an
element of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1962).
255. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.2 (1984).
256. Compton, supra note 250, at 388.
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the ability to form the requisite mens rea.257 Once the burden of production
is met, the evidence used to show diminished capacity is essentially the
same as the evidence that would be used to show insanity. Generally, the
testimony of a mental health clinician is offered at trial to show that the
defendant's capacity to form the requisite mens rea was "diminished" at
the time of the crime due to some mental disease or defect. 8 Such expert
testimony must not only be offered by a properly qualified expert, but
must also conform to the other applicable rules of evidence with regard to
expert testimony.259
C. What Counts as a PredicateMental Disorderfor Diminished
CapacityPurposes?
What qualifies as a "mental disease or defect" for insanity defense
purposes is often quite different from what qualifies as a mental disorder
for diminished capacity purposes. In light of IDRA and the majority of
states that adopted its approach, it is clear that cognitive impairment is
necessary to find insanity in most of the United States today.2 60 What
qualifies for diminished capacity is significantly broader. For example, a
learning disability generally does not constitute a "mental disease or
defect" for insanity purposes.2 61 But if a learning disabled person strikes
someone but is unable to know that the blow could kill as a result of his or
her disability, he or she might be able to assert diminished capacity to
negate the mens rea of intent to kill if charged a crime.262
The broad scope of what can qualify as diminished capacity is
illustrated by United States v. McBroom. 263 The defendant in McBroom

257. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 230-31 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(stating that even when the state has the burden of persuasion, a defendant may have the burden of
producing evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the issue); see also PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 64(a) (1984).
258. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403,421-23 (discussing use of expert testimony
as part of defendants' attempts to rebut mens rea).
259. Id. at 421-23; see also State v. Weeks, 367 S.E.2d 895, 904 (N.C. 1988) (holding
psychiatric testimony about a murder suspect's mental state was inadmissible because it used legal
terms of art that were not readily understood by the expert).
260. Recent Case, CriminalLawand CriminalProcedure:CriminalLaw-FederalSentencing
Guidelines-ThirdCircuitHolds that VolitionalImpairmentsCan Support a Claim ofDiminished
Mental Capacity, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1122 (1998).
261. See supra Part III.A.1.
262. See State v. Breakiron, 532 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1987).
263. 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997).
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pled guilty to possessing child pornography. 2 4 At sentencing, he argued
for mitigation in his sentence because "he suffered from a significantly
reduced mental capacity due to the sexual abuse he had endured as a child,
and that this reduced capacity compelled him to possess child
' Although the trial court agreed that the defendant had
pornography."265
fallen victim to repeated sexual abuse and suffered from bipolar disorder
and multiple impulse control disorders, the circuit court determined that
neither the abuse nor the disorders impacted the defendant's cognitive
ability (i.e., knowing right from wrong).26 6 Therefore, the Court held that
a downward departure in sentencing was unwarranted.267 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that volitional impairment (including
impulse control personality disorders) should be considered as evidence
of diminished capacity under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines when
determining the appropriateness of sentence mitigation.268
Some jurisdictions have adopted such broad definitions of diminished
capacity that a qualifying "mental disease or defect" need not even be
recognized by the DSM. One of the leading cases in this area is the New
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Galloway.269 In Galloway, the
Court stated that "[florms ofpsychopathology other than clinically defined
mental diseases or defects may affect the mental process and diminish
cognitive capacity, and therefore may be regarded as a mental disease or
defect in the statutory or legal sense."27 As such, whether a mental disease
or defect works to impair cognitive function is decided on a case by case
basis in New Jersey.

264. Id. at 534.
265. Id. at 539.
266. Id. at 540.
267. Id.
268. McBroom, 124 F.3d at 547-48; see also United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370-71 (7th
Cir. 1996). But see United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring
cognitive impairment); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1992) (requiring
cognitive impairment).
269. State v. Galloway, 628 A.2d 735 (N.J. 1993). In Galloway, the defendant was convicted
of murder and endangering the welfare of a child when he caused the death of his girlfriend's baby
by shaking the baby (i.e., "Shaken Baby Syndrome"). Id. at 738. The intermediate appellate court
upheld the conviction, holding that the defendant's borderline personality disorder, even though
it rendered the defendant unable to control his impulses, was not a sufficient "mental disease or
defect" for diminished capacity purposes. Id. at 739 (citing 611 A.2d 651 (1992)). The high court
reversed, holding that "all mental deficiencies, including conditions that cause a loss of emotional
control, may satisfy the diminished-capacity defense if the record shows that experts in the
psychological field believe ... that kind of mental deficiency can affect a person's cognitive
faculties ... " Id. at 743.
270. Id. at 741 (citing Slovenko, supra note 234, at 16).
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It is somewhat ironic that the standard for qualifying a mental disease
or defect for insanity defense purposes is rather stringent, while
simultaneously being so much broader for diminished capacity purposes.
This is especially true because of how much easier it is to get an acquittal
by creating reasonable doubt, using a diminished capacity argument by
reason of insanity, something the defendant must prove often by clear and
convincing evidence. Moreover, those found not guilty by reason of
insanity rarely go free; in contrast, those who successfully assert
diminished capacity evidence are found not guilty and are therefore set
free. Given the benefits of diminished capacity, it is not surprising that
defendants have attempted to extend the doctrine in a multitude of ways.
Part IV of this Article is devoted to examining the ways in which
defendants have tried to do just that.
IV. BEYOND DIMINISHED CAPACITY
The rationale underlying diminished capacity has been extended to a
variety of situations. By its use, defendants share the common goal to
reduce criminal liability "due to some extenuating circumstance that
allegedly rendered the defendant unable to form the requisite mens rea of
a crime or led to it being formed defectively-as a result of some mental
condition rather than out of 'normal' criminal intent."27 ' Accordingly,
these "defenses" are really just extensions of diminished capacity.27 2
A. PosttraumaticStress DisorderDefense
Extreme cases of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may serve as
the qualifying "mental disease or defect" for an insanity defense.2 73 Of
course, to do so effectively in the overwhelming majority of courts in the
United States, the disorder would have to render the defendant unable to
substantially appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his or her

271. HENRY F. FRADELLA, KEY CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 217 (2000).
272. This section focuses on some of the more commonly used variations of diminished
capacity. There are less commonly used variations such as the so-called Twinkie Defense, see
People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981), and the XYY Syndrome
Defense. See, e.g., Sana Halwani & Daniel Brian Krupp, The Genetic Defense: The Impact of

Genetics on the Concept of CriminalResponsibility, 12 HEALTH L.J. 35 (2004).
273. Debra D. Burke & Mary Anne Nixon, Post-TraumaticStress Disorderand the Death
Penalty, 38 How. L.J. 183 (1994); Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-TraumaticStress Disorder:A
ControversialDefensefor Veterans of a ControversialWar, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415 (1988).
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actions. 27 4 But if the level of impairment does not rise to the level of
insanity, the disorder27may still be used as the predicate for a finding of
diminished capacity.
PTSD was first noted in America after the Civil War, though little was
known about it then.276 Subsequent wars, especially the two World Wars
(during which time it was often referred to as "shell shock" and "combat
fatigue") 277 and the Vietnam War,27 led to study of the condition. PTSD
was recognized as a mental disorder in 1980 by the American Psychiatric
Association.2 9 The condition originally applied only to veterans of wars
who experienced intense "flashbacks" to times of combat.280 During these
flashbacks, individuals were known to have violent outbreaks, but PTSD
evolved to encompass almost any individual who experienced extreme
trauma or violence.28' Such exposure remains a "necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for the development of PTSD. '282 Because PTSD can
affect one's perception of reality, including the circumstances in which
one finds oneself even in "normal" situations, PTSD can interfere with the
formation of mens rea and therefore serve as a predicate for introducing
diminished capacity evidence.283
Since its acceptance as a bona fide medical condition, 281 Courts have
been more accepting of the PTSD defense than other excuse defenses since
it appears to be the very type of disorder diminished capacity is designed
to encompass. For example, in State v. Phipps,2 85 the defendant was a Gulf
War veteran who was on trial for murder. 286 On the day in question, Phipps

274.
275.
276.
277.
J. AIR L.
278.
279.
(1990).
280.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
Davidson, supra note 273, at 417-18.
Id.;
see also Michael J.Pangia, PosttraumaticStress Disorder:LitigationStrategies, 64
& COM. 1091, 1093 (1999).
Davidson, supra note 273, at 415.
Eric H. Marcus, Post-TraumaticStress Disorder: Facts and Myths, 32 TRAUMA 49
John E. Helzer et al., Post -TraumaticStress Disorderin the GeneralPopulation,NEW

ENG. J. MED., Dec. 24, 1989, at 1630.

281. See Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility of Post-TraumaticStress Disorder,24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2001).
282. Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of CriminalDefense Based Upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV.
731, 761 (1996).
283. Davidson, supra note 273, at 422.
284. See generally PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION:
FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS (1980).

285. State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
286. Id.at 139.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

went to his wife's home, where upon he got into an argument with his
wife's lover who threatened Phipps with a stick.287 Phipps took the stick
and hit the wife's lover repeatedly with it, eventually killing him.288 At
trial, the defense presented expert testimony that Phipps suffered from
depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.289 Even the prosecution's
expert testified that his impairment was "'of a sufficient level to
significantly affect his thinking, reasoning, judgment, and emotional wellbeing.""'29 Moreover, his PTSD "'may have lessened his threshold or
made him more sensitive to defending himself and protecting himself and
increased the likelihood of him overreacting to a real or perceived
threat. "291

The trial court judge refused to give a jury instruction which would
have allowed the jury to consider the evidence of mental disorders in
relation to whether Phipps possessed the required mens rea for first-degree
murder. The appeals court reversed the decision, holding that evidence of
the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense is admissible to
refute elements of specific intent in first-degree murder cases. 92
But the acceptance of PTSD as a form of diminished capacity has not
been universal, in spite of the generally accepted proposition that PTSD
impairs an individual's mental functioning. Some critics have challenged
the diagnosis of the disorder as being overly subjective, largely due to the
fact that a PTSD diagnosis is based on patient testimonials and personal
observations. 293 These critics fear that the disorder is often contrived just
for the purposes of criminal defense. 294 Efforts are underway to provide a
physiological basis for PTSD diagnosis, rather than relying on the
patient's subjective assertions. 295 As of yet, no physiological evidence has
been presented to a court. For now, in those jurisdictions that allow the use
of diminished capacity evidence, mental health professionals are generally
allowed to testify not only as to whether the defendant has PTSD, but also

287. Id. at 141.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d at 141.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 149.
293. See, e.g., Roger K. Pittman & Scott P. Orr, PsychophysiologicTestingforPost-Traumatic
Stress Disorder: ForensicPsychiatricApplication, 21 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 37, 39
(1993).
294. Id. at 39.
295. Id. at 40.
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whether the disorder influenced the defendant's capacity to form the
requisite criminal intent at the time of the offense.29 6
B. Battered Women's Syndrome Defense
1. Battered Women's Syndrome Defense
Dr. Lenore Walker first coined the term "Battered Women's
Syndrome" (BWS) in her 1979 book, The Battered Woman.297 In it,
Walker put forth a theory that attempted to explain why abused women
stayed in abusive relationships, and what finally triggers them to strike
back.2 98 Walker's research has been criticized as "little more than a
patchwork of pseudo-scientific methods employed to confirm a hypothesis
that its author and participating researchers never seriously doubted."2 99
Such criticisms aside, there can be no doubt that Walker's work had a
significant impact on the law, even if not on psychology. Her theory of
BWS has been accepted in many U.S. courts and continues to enjoy
widespread acceptance.3"'
As conceptualized by Walker, BWS develops as a result of exposure
to a three-phase cycle of violence that typifies abusive relationships.3", The
first phase is called the "tension-building phase," which is characterized
by arguments and ever increasing tensions and may include minor acts of
violence, such as slapping.30 2 Eventually, however, there is an event that
triggers the second phase, which Walker calls the "acute battering
incident." During this phase, the abuser explodes in a fit of rage and
batters the victim.

30 3 Walker

hypothesized that the acute battering incident

296. See, e.g., Alberto M. Goldwaser, A ForensicPsychiatrist's Viewpoint Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder,229 N.J. LAW. Aug. 2004, at 28-33.
297. LENORE E.WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER I].
298. Walker's theory was based on her clinical observations of abused women, not on
empirical research. Walker's second book followed in 1984, offering empirical data in support of
her theory. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER
II].
299. David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 68 (1997).
300. Id.; see also Regina Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Battered Woman Syndrome and
Other Effects ofDomestic Violence Against Women, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 8 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997); Stephen J. Morse,
The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft Psychology and Bad Law: PsychologicalSelf-Defense as a
Justificationfor Homicide, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 595 (1990).
301. WALKER II, supra note 298, at 95-96.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 95.
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causes the abuser to feel and express remorse, apologize profusely, and
engage in loving, caring, and helpful behaviors to promote
reconciliation. 3" In spite of the abuser's promises that it will "never
happen again," the cycle inevitably repeats itself."5
Walker also offered an explanation as to why the cycle repeats itself,
borrowing from behavioral psychology's notion of learned helplessness as
espoused by noted psychologist Martin Seligman." 6 Seligman conducted
experiments on dogs during which time the animals were placed in
harnesses and were electrically shocked at random intervals.3" 7 At first, the
dogs tried to escape, but given that the physical restraints in which they
were placed made it impossible, the dogs eventually stopped escape
attempts.30 8 In other words, they eventually accepted the fact that they
were helpless to prevent the shocks. More importantly, though, after the
dogs passively acquiesced to the shocks without resistance, Seligman
changed the set up of the experiment by giving the dogs an opportunity to
escape.30 9 However, the dogs failed to avail themselves of the opportunity.
Seligman concluded that the dogs viewed themselves as helpless and
simply accepted their fate accordingly. 310 Some dogs were actually
physically dragged out of the environment to show them how to escape the
shocks.311 Of these dogs, only some "unlearned" their learned
helplessness; others never learned they could escape.3 12
Walker used the theory of learned helplessness to explain why battered
women do not leave abusive relationships, building on the work of other
researchers who had attempted to show how learned helplessness develops
in humans. 3 3 According to Walker, a woman stays for a number of
psycho-social reasons. She may have old-fashioned notions that "a
woman's proper place is in the home., 314 She may be economically

304. Id.at 96.
305. Id.
306. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968).
307. Id. at 259-60.
308. Id.at 260.
309. Id.at 260-61.
310. Id.at 261.
311. Seligman et al., supra note 306, at 261-62.
312. Id.at260-61.
313. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH
216 (1975); Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and
Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, 50 (1978).
314. WALKER II, supra note 298, at 31, 33-34.
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dependent on the abuser." 5 They may have children and the woman may
not want to separate them from their father.316 The stigma that attaches to
a woman who leaves the family without her children undoubtedly also acts
as a further deterrent to moving out.3 17 Some women may even perceive

the battering cycle as normal, especially if they grew up in a violent
household.3"8 And even when battered women want to leave, they are
typically unwilling to reach out and confide in their friends, family, or the
police, either out of shame and humiliation, fear of reprisal by their
husband, or the feeling they will not be believed. 19 But one of the most
important factors for Walker in a woman's decision to stay with her abuser
is the loving and caring behavior the batterer exhibits during the
reconciliation phase.3 2' For Walker, the abuser's contrite behavior acts as
a "positive reinforcement for [the victim] remaining in the relationship." 32 '
The combination of the above factors leads a victim of abuse to feel
powerless to leave. Moreover, as she stays and tries to prevent the cycle
of violence from repeating, she learns that it is not really within her power
to control the abuser's feelings and temper. Her repeated failures to
prevent tension from building up to an acute battering incident mirrors the
learning of the dogs in Seligman's research.3 22 The repeated, failed
attempts "to control the violence would, over time, produce learned
helplessness and depression as the repeated batterings, like 3electrical
23
shocks, [would] diminish the woman's motivation to respond.
The cycle of violence tends to worsen as time passes. Not only may
acute battering incidents become more frequent, but also they may become
more severe.3 24 Eventually, however, the woman endures "so much
frustration, despair, and isolation that her perceptions of violence are
altered. The woman may violently strike back against the batterer in an
effort to free herself from the cycle of abuse that she may believe

315. Id. at 127-44; see also Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered
Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 552 (1988).
316. Mather, supra note 315, at 552 (citing WALKER II, supra note 298, at 127-44).
317. Id. at 552; WALKER II, supranote 298, at 167; see also State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372
(N.J. 1984).
318. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371-72 (citing BATTERED WOMEN, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 60 (M. Roy ed. 1977)).

319. Mather, supra note 315, at 547-60.
320. WALKER II, supra note 298, at 95-96.

321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at96.
See supra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
WALKER II, supra note 298, at 87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See Lamis Ali Safa, The Abuse Behind Closed Doors and the Screams That Are Never

Heard,22 T. MARHSALL L. REV. 281, 294 n. 121 (1997) (citing WALKER I, supra note 297, at 43).

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

ultimately will lead to her death."3 5 When the woman's strike-back leads
to the filing of criminal charges against her for aggravated assault or
homicide because the elements of the traditional defense of self-defense
appear to be missing, BWS evidence will normally become the foundation
of the woman's defense.326
2. Emergence of a Battered Women's Syndrome Defense
Whether there is actually a Battered Women's Syndrome Defense
(BWSD) is a matter of some controversy. "The defense of battered women
who kill their mates is slowly developing a distinct style or technique
called the abused spouse defense," which is a hybrid of "the more familiar
327
and established defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity.
Others insist it is not a defense in and of itself, but rather a psychological
theory offered in support of the traditional defense of self-defense.32 8
The purpose of offering evidence of BWS is to fill a gap left by the law
of self-defense and by the PTSD. BWSD is most frequently used in courts
to explain the behavior of women who turn on their abusers and, in turn,
to reduce their criminal responsibility. 329 BWSD is similar to PTSD in that
the defendant's prior history or experience triggers a violent response.
Battered women were frequently unable to assert PTSD, however, because
they could not fulfill all of the diagnostic requirements of PTSD.33 °
The traditional self-defense doctrine recognizes the legitimacy of the
use of force only when necessary to prevent an imminent attack from

325. Tosha Yvette Foster, Note, From Fearto Rage: Black Rage as a NaturalProgression
from and FunctionalEquivalent of Battered Woman Syndrome, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1851,
1859 (1997) (citing WALKER I, supra note 297, at 69-70).
326. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
327. Elizabeth Vaughn & Maureen L. Moore, The BatteredSpouse Defense in Kentucky, 10
N. Ky.L. REV.399, 399 (1983).
328. Roberta K. Thyfault, Comment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20
CAL. W. L. REV. 485, 495 (1984).
329. See generally John W. Roberts, Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Bold: Battered
Woman 's Syndrome as an Excusefor Self-Defense in Non-ConfrontationalHomicide,27 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 136-37 (2003).
330. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1199-1200 (1993); see
generally Brett C. Trowbridge, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Washington on Post
Traumatic Stress Disorderand Related Trauma Syndromes: Avoiding the Battle of the Experts by
Restoringthe Use of Objective PsychologicalTestimony in the Courtroom,27 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
453, 517-18 (2003).
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unlawful force.33 ' As such, when a battered woman uses force to defend
herself from such an unlawful, imminent attack, there is no problem in
using the defense of self-defense. But in many cases, battered women act
against their abusers when they are not in "imminent danger" and,
therefore, are not acting within the technical requirements of the law of
self-defense.332 Alternatively, battered women may use deadly force when
they were confronted only with physical force, another requirement of the
law of self-defense.333 BWS evidence can help to explain why a woman
might reasonably believe, in light of her history of abuse, her life was in
danger, even though to the lay person she was not facing what objectively
looked like a threat of imminent, unlawful force.334
Interestingly, the use of BWS evidence has not been confined to cases
where an abused woman strikes out against her abuser. Where the state of
mind of the defendant at the time of the crime is at issue, BWS evidence
can be offered to show that the defendant did not possess the required
mental state-a diminished capacity argument in its purest form.335 For
example, the family court in In re Glenn G. relieved a mother of liability
for child abuse after evidence of BWS was offered.336 The mother,
however, was still held liable for child neglect, a strict liability offense.33 7
In United States v. Marenghi, the defendant offered BWS evidence to
show she lacked the intent necessary for a conviction on possession and
distribution of controlled substances.338 The Marenghicourt reasoned that
the evidence was not being offered as a defense to the charges themselves,
but rather as part of an attempt to show that the defendant's capacity was
diminished
in such a way that she did not entertain the requisite mens
39
rea.

3

331. Jane Campbell Moriarty, "While Dangers Gather": The Bush Preemption Doctrine,
Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
1, 20 (2006) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRimINAL LAW § 10.4, at 539 (4th ed. 2003)).
332. See, e.g., Trowbridge, supra note 330, at 495; Joshua Dressier, Battered Women and
Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457 (2006) (arguing against allowing
BWS evidence to be used to expand traditional notions of self-defense).
333. Moriarty, supra note 331, at 20; see also Faigman & Wright, supra note 299, at 81.
334. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (allowing BWS testimony because it aided
juries "in determining whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed
there was imminent danger to her life."); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C.
1979) (same).
335. Faigman & Wright, supra note 299, at 95.
336. In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Fain. Ct. 1992), affd, 630 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App.
Div.), leave to app. denied, 662 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1995).
337. Id. at 470.
338. United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. Me. 1995).
339. Id. at 89-91.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 18

3. Validity of the BWS Defense
As noted above, Walker's research suffered from serious
methodological flaws.3 40 In fact, the research fails to demonstrate that
abused women experience the cycle of violence as explained by Walker
or that abused women learn they are helpless to prevent it.34'
Consequently, some courts have excluded BWS evidence as unreliable.342
However, in spite ofthese shortcomings, many courts continue to embrace
BWS testimony in BWS cases. 343 Some believe this is driven by political
motivation (i.e., not wanting to seem unsympathetic to the plight of the
battered woman), while others see it as blind adherence to precedent
established in the wake of Walker's initial research without critically
examining the questionable reliability and validity of the BWS as
elucidated by contemporary research. 3 " Regardless of the reasons
underlying its continued acceptance, it is clear that many states continue
to allow BWS evidence.345 The presentation of psychological evidence
concerning both the syndrome itself and the application of it to the facts
of any particular case, therefore, remains an important function of forensic
psychologists and psychiatrists.

340. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
341. OLA W. BARNETr & ALYEE D. LAVOLETrE, IT COULD HAPPEN To ANYONE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN STAY 105-07 (1993); Regina A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the Literature, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273,
280 (1992); JuLIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE 192 (1989); RICHARD
J. GELLES & CLAIRE PEDRICK CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE INFAMILIES 77 (1985).
342. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 507 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Buhrle v. State, 627
P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (criticizing not only Walker's methodology, but also finding that the
defendant's case did not mirror that of the typical battered woman and, therefore, Walker
inadequately explained and apparently ignored many of the troubling facts in the case "in arriving
at an opinion").
343. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding BWS
evidence to satisfy the Daubert test).
344. See generally Faigman & Wright, supranote 299.
345. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989); Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267
(Conn. 1993); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.
2d 801 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); People v. Minnis, 455
N.E.2d 209 (I11.App. Ct. 1983); State v. Green, 652 P.2d 697 (Kan. 1982); State v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Hennum 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1984); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811
(N.D. 1983); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); State v. Wilkins, 407 S.E.2d
670 (S.C. 1991); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1990); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309
(Tex. 1988); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
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C. Black Rage Defense
The Black Rage defense is arguably the most controversial extension
of the diminished capacity doctrine. Although discussed in the literature
from time to time, the defense was brought into the spotlight during the
trial of Colin Ferguson. 46 Ferguson had opened fire on a Long Island
railroad car full of passengers, killing six people and injuring nineteen
more.34 7 After his arrest for the 1994 shooting, police discovered writings

in which Ferguson wrote of his hatred for "whites, Asians and Uncle Tom
Negroes," which led his lawyer, the late, celebrated civil rights attorney
William Kunstler, to formulate a variant of the PTSD defense predicated
upon "black rage. '' 348 Before trial, however, Ferguson fired Kunstler and
was granted permission to represent himself pro se. 34 9 When acting as his
own attorney (his competence to do so being highly questionable),
Ferguson did not argue Black Rage. Instead, and in spite of a train car full
of eyewitnesses, he argued that he had fallen asleep on the train and
someone else stole his gun from his bag and committed the shootings.35 °
The Black Rage defense, therefore, was never tested in court. It did,
however, provoke national debate over the legitimacy of such a defense.351
The first case to assert something akin to the Black Rage defense in the
United States occurred in 1846 in the trial of William Freeman.352
Freeman, the son of an ex-slave, was wrongly convicted and incarcerated
for stealing a horse. 353 He escaped from jail, was recaptured, and was then
sentenced to a prison term of hard labor.354 During his prison sentence,

Freeman suffered extensive psychological and physical abuse that
included whippings and beatings of such severity that he was rendered

346. See Deborah L. Goldklang, Post-TraumaticStress Disorderand Black Rage: Clinical
Validity, CriminalResponsibility, 5 VA. J.SOC. POL'Y & L. 213 (1997).
347. John T. McQuiston, Jury Finds Ferguson Guilty of Slayings on the L.I.R.R.: Families of
the Dead and the Survivors Cheer the Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al.
348. Goldklang, supra note 346.
349. See John T. McQuiston, In the BizarreL.I.R.R. Trial, EquallyBizarre Confrontations,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at 13LI.
350. Id.
351. CompareKimberly M. Copp, Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacyofa CriminalDefense,
29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 205 (1995) (arguing against recognition of the defense), with Foster, supra
note 325, at 1865-75 (arguing for recognition of the defense).
352. Goldklang, supra note 346, at 217 (citing Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1847)).
353. Id. at 239.
354. Id.
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nearly completely deaf.3 5 After his release from prison, Freeman
unsuccessfully sought employment from a Caucasian couple.3 56 Freeman
killed the couple and other members of their family.357
Freeman's attorney, William Henry Seward, argued an early
version of the insanity defense to the jury, contending that
mistreatment by whites left his client with a life "'so filled with
neglect, injustice, and severity, with anxiety, pain, disappointment,
solicitude, and grief, [that it] would have its fitting conclusion in a
madhouse."' Although the jury rejected Freeman's insanity
defense, the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial, in part
due to the trial court's limitation of expert testimony concerning
Freeman's sanity. Before the retrial commenced, however, Freeman
died in jail of tuberculosis. 8
The theoretical underpinning of the Black Rage defense is clearly the
diminished capacity doctrine. Psychiatrists William H. Grier and Price M.
Cobbs first advanced the notion of Black Rage in 1969 when they asserted
that African-Americans, as an insular racial minority in the United States,
have endured years of discrimination starting in colonial days with slavery
and continuing to the present. 9 This discrimination resulted in inadequate
educational and employment opportunities for African-Americans as a
group, and thus disproportionate suffering from poverty and high
unemployment.36 ° As a result of this significant inequality, AfricanAmericans suffer both "pent-up frustration" and "'cultural paranoia' in
'
The
which every member of the white race is a possible enemy."361
frustration and the paranoia eventually builds to a point of "blind rage,
hatred, and ultimately, lethal violence" when someone suffering from
Black Rage retaliates against one or more of the perceived oppressors,
namely members of the white race.36 2

355. Falk, supra note 282, at 749 n.99; Jennifer L. Larkin, The Insanity Defense Founded on
Ethnic Oppression:Defending the Accused in the InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe Former
Yugoslavia, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 91, 102 (2001).
356. Larkin, supra note 355, at 102.
357. Id.; Goldklang, supra note 346, at 239.
358. Goldklang, supranote 346, at 239 (internal citations omitted).
359. WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 161 (1968).
360. Id.; see also Copp, supra note 351, at 223.
361. Copp, supra note 351, at 228 (citing ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL SILLEN, RACISM
& PSYCHIATRY 54-55 (1972)).
362. Id.at 229 (citing THOMAS J. SCHEFF & SUZANNE M. RETZINGER, EMOTIONS AND
VIOLENCE: SHAME AND RAGE IN DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS 65-66 (1991)).
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The notion of building frustration leading to violence embodied in the
concept of Black Rage is referred to as frustration-aggression. 363 The
Black Rage defense does not seek to excuse conduct along the lines of the
insanity defense. Rather, it seeks to explain the evolution of anger so
intense
that it can impair someone's capacity to form mens rea in a normal
364
way.
The Black Rage defense has been criticized as an invalid extension of
other forms of diminished capacity. PTSD, for example, seeks to explain
the conduct of a single person which arose in connection with an
identifiable, traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual
human experience, such as "military combat, violent personal assault,
being kidnapped, being taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, [and]
incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp. ' 365 Although
there is no doubt that African-Americans have endured invidious
discrimination, it is highly questionable whether discrimination in the
post-civil rights era would qualify as a trauma of such magnitude that it
could cause something akin to PTSD.36 6 Moreover, to the extent that it
might qualify, even harsh discrimination is quite different from a traumatic
occurrence. For example, if one witnessed a family member as the victim
of a racially motivated lynching, such an experience would be well within
the diagnostic predicate for PTSD and its associated defense based on
diminished capacity. However, blanket assertions of racism over one's
lifetime do not demonstrate the same clear requisite trauma. Other groups
have faced intense forms of racism and oppression, including women,
Jews, homosexuals, and certain ethnicities at various points in history.36 7
Yet, there has been no significant movement to classify any such groups
as candidates for a variant of PTSD sufficient to diminish the capacity to
form mens rea.
Some might argue that Black Rage is more similar to the development
of BWS, since a cycle of mistreatment over time is allegedly responsible
for both, and the victim feels helpless to overcome or escape from that
which inflicts the suffering. Copp pointed out, however, that when a
battered woman strikes back, she does so at her abuser.368 In doing so, she
insulates herself from future abuse at his hands. In contrast, someone with

363. Id. at 228 (citing SCHEFF & RETZINGER, supranote 362, at xix).
364. Id.at 229.
365. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUAL 424 (4th

ed. 1994); see also DSM-IV-TR, supranote 83, at 463-65.
366. Copp, supra note 351, at 233-34.
367. Id.
368. Id.at 234.
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Black Rage has no readily identifiable person at the root of his or her
oppression, nor will striking out against someone eliminate racism or
discrimination.369
To date, the debate about the propriety of using Black Rage as a
criminal defense has been mostly academic. It is feasible that forensic
mental health professionals might be called upon to assess someone
suffering from Black Rage. But in light of the fact that it is not recognized
as a mental disorder in the DSM-IV-TR, it is questionable whether it
would be accepted in court as a bona fide defense. This conclusion is
further bolstered in light of the Daubert requirements concerning the
reliability of expert testimony and the methods they use.3 7° Since Black
Rage is more a sociological construct than a disorder validated by any
reliable empirical support, the debate over Black Rage is likely to remain
academic.
D. The PMS Defense
1. Background on PMS
Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS) was first described in medical literature
in 1931 by endocrinologist Robert Frank.37 ' Frank described personality
changes in women that corresponded to changes in hormone levels in the
time period prior to menstruation.372 The syndrome was defined in 1965
as "any combination of emotional or physical features which occurs
cyclically in a female before menstruation and which regresses and
disappears during menstruation. '373 PMS is commonly typified by
behavioral symptoms, which include irritability, anger, confusion, and
mood swings, 374 and physical symptoms such as headaches, bloating, and
breast tenderness.375

369. Id.
370. See generally Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 403 (2003) (reviewing judicial application of
Daubertto expert testimony from behavioral scientists).
371. Lee Solomon, PremenstrualSyndrome: The DebateSurrounding CriminalDefense, 54
MD. L. REv. 571, 573 (1995) (citing Robert T. Frank, The Hormonal Causes of Premenstrual
Tension, 26 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 1053 (1931)).
372. Id.; see also Joseph H. Morton, Chronic Cystic Mastitis and Sterility, 6 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY 802 (1946).
373. Solomon, supra note 371, at 573 (citing Hamish Sutherland & lain Stewart, A Critical
Analysis ofthe PremenstrualSyndrome, 1 LANCET 1180, 1182 (1965)).
374. Id.
375. Id.
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Experts cannot agree on the cause of PMS.

76

65

Some believe an excess

of estrogen in relation to progesterone causes the syndrome.377 Other
theories include: "the rise and fall of both estrogen and progesterone; the
rapid decline in a metabolite of a neurotransmitter; yeast overgrowth in the
intestines; [progesterone] allergies; ... psychological stress, 37' as well as
fluid retention, vitamin deficiencies, hypoglycemia, nutritional
deficiencies, endometrial toxins, and endogenous opiate excess or
withdrawal. 37 9 The DSM-IV-TR brought official recognition to a new
mental disorder called Premenstrual Dysmorphic Disorder (PMDD),
formerly known as Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder (LLPDD).38 ° It
is a more severe form of PMS that affects an estimated two to five percent
of menstruating women.3 l One commentator explained the difference
between PMS and PMDD by analogizing the former to a cold and the
latter to full-blown pneumonia.38 2
2. The PMS Defense
PMS was first used to mitigate criminal culpability in England where
it was first recognized as a variant of diminished responsibility.3 3
Defendants in the United States, however, have attempted to use PMS as
a type of diminished capacity defense to wholly excuse their conduct. In
People v. Santos, one of first cases to attempt such a use of the PMS
defense, the legitimacy of the defense was not tested at trial since the
parties negotiated a plea bargain after the defendant gave notice of her
376. Id. at 573 (citing Robert M. Carney & Brian D. Williams, Recent Decisions, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 253,255 (1983)); see also Robert L. Reid & S.C. Yen, PremenstrualSyndrome, 139
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 85,86 (1981) ("Efforts to compare epidemiologic data on PMS
are likely to be misleading because of variable interpretation of the clinical manifestations and the
obvious difficulties encountered in quantitating [sic] the severity of symptoms.").
377. Solomon, supra note 371, at 573.
378. Id. at 574 (internal citations omitted).
379. Nicole R. Grose, Note, PremenstrualDysphoric Disorderas a Mitigating Factorin
Sentencing:Followingthe LeadofEnglish CriminalCourts,33 VAL. U.L. REV. 201,203-08 & n.33
(1998) (citing, inter alia, William R. Keye, Jr. & Eric Trunnell, PremenstrualSyndrome: A Medical
Perspective,9 HAMLINE L. REV. 165, 170-73 & n.23 (1986)).
380. Solomon, supra note 371, at 577.
381. Grose, supra note 379, at 209 n.54 (citing Meir Steiner, PremenstrualSyndromes, 48
ANN. REv. MED. 448 (1997); Barbara L. Parry, Psychobiology of Premenstrual Dysphoric
Disorder, 15 SEMINARS INREPROD. ENDOCRINOLOGY 55 (1997)).
382. Jamie Talan, Are Monthly Blues a Mental Disorder?,NEWSDAY, July 10, 1993, at 10.
383. Grose, supra note 379, at 209-14 (citing Regina v. Craddock, 1 C.L. 49 (1980); Regina
v. Smith, No. l/AJ82 (C.A. Crim.Div. 1982), (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File at *1); Regina
v. English, Norwich Crown Ct. 1981 (unreported); Regina v. Reynolds, Crim. L.R. 679 (C.A.
1988), (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File, at *1)).
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intent to use the defense.3 84 Other cases attempting to use PMS as a
defense were rejected in the years following Santos.385
In 199 1, however, the first successful PMS defense in the United States
was used in a Virginia trial in Commonwealth v. Richter.386 The defendant
was a physician who was stopped for erratic driving.387 She had her
children in the car with her.388 The state trooper who pulled her over
noticed a strong smell of alcohol on her breath. The defendant
refused to take field sobriety tests, tried to kick the officer in the
groin, used offensive language, and threatened the officer by
saying, "You son of a [expletive]; you [expletive] can't do this to
me; I'm a doctor. I hope you [expletive] get shot and come to my
,,389
hospital so I can refuse to treat you ....
At her trial for driving under the influence, the defendant's attorney
successfully used a dual line of defense. First, the defense argued the
results of the breathalyzer test, which yielded a 0.13% blood alcohol
concentration, were invalid.39 The defense then attempted to explain her
hostile conduct was due to PMS, not intoxication. 391 The defendant was
found not guilty.392 Given the unique facts of this case, it is important to
note that the PMS defense was not specifically accepted or rejected in
Richter. Rather, it was used to explain the defendant's hostile and
combative behavior, thereby assisting in the creation of reasonable doubt
with respect to whether she had been driving while intoxicated.
In the years since Richter, PMDD was officially recognized in the
DSM-IV. Whether it will be accepted as a qualifying mental disease or
defect for insanity or for diminished capacity purposes has not yet been

384. Grose, supranote 379, at 215 (citing People v. Santos, No. 1K046229 (Crim. Ct. Kings.
County, N.Y. 1982) (unpublished opinion)).
385. See Lovato v. Irvin, 31 B.R. 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (refusing to accept PMS, due
to its questionable scientific validity and reliability, as a means of discharging a debt in a
bankruptcy proceeding when the debt was a judgment obtained in an intentional tort action); State
v. Lashwood, 384 N.W.2d 319 (S.D. 1986) (refusing to set aside a plea entered into while the
defendant was suffering from PMS).
386. See Solomon, supranote 371, at 586 (citing DeNeen L. Brown, PMS Defense Successful
in Va. Drunken Driving Case, WASH. POST, June 7, 1991, at Al).
387. Grose, supra note 379, at 216.
388. Id.
389. Solomon, supra note 371, at 586 n.146 (alterations and omission in original).
390. Id. at 586 n.147.
391. Id. at 586-87.
392. Grose, supra note 379, at 217.
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determined. Critics argue that medical disagreement about its cause,
symptoms, and treatment makes it very difficult for PMS to gain legal
recognition as a complete defense.393 Even if allowed, using the defense
successfully might prove very difficult in light of the fact that the
diagnosis is almost completely dependent on self-reported data from an
obviously interested party (i.e., a criminal defendant) and other biased
witnesses who are close to her.394
Other critics of the PMS defense argue that it is a dangerous precedent
that can be used to encroach upon women's rights. Its use could lead to the
societal labeling of women as "deficient" or being "mentally and
' Such arguments, if accepted, could be used to
physically unstable."395
justify keeping women out of certain executive and military roles and
could even be used against women in divorce or custody proceedings.396
In spite of these concerns, supporters of the defense feel it should be used
as a tool to mitigate punishment and to provide for therapeutic
sentencing.397 Whatever its future, it is clear that forensic behavioral
scientists will play an important role in the evolution of the PMS defense.
E. Media Intoxication
A number of cases have asserted claims of insanity based on "media
intoxication" from television, movies, pornography, and music. These
cases have all been unsuccessful in their quests to do so. For example, in
the case of Florida v. Zamora, a fifteen-year-old boy was accused of
killing an eighty-two-year-old woman after breaking into her house and
stealing a gun and money.398 Zamora's attorney pled insanity on his
behalf.3 99 In support of the insanity claim, the defense offered evidence

393. Id. at 220 (citing Robert Mark Carney & Brian D. Williams, PremenstrualSyndrome: A
CriminalDefense, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 267 (1983).
394. Elizabeth Holtzman, PremenstrualSymptoms: No Legal Defense, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
712, 714-15 (1986); Kay A. Heggestad, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Case Against Using
PremenstrualSyndrome as a Defense in a Court of Law, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 155, 161 (1986).
395. Grose, supranote 379, at 224 (citing, inter alia, Holtzman, supranote 394, at 715; Linda
L. Castle, PMS as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 70 A.B.A. J. 211 (1984)).
396. Id. at 225 (citing Candy Pahl-Smith, PremenstrualSyndrome as a CriminalDefense: The
Needfor a Medico-Legal Understanding,15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 246,256 (1984); Carney & Williams,
supra note 393, at 268).
397. Id. at 220-30; Solomon, supra note 371, at 598-99; Ruth Macklin, The Premenstrual
Syndrome (PMS) Label: Benefit or Burden, in PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME 17, 23 (Benson E.
Ginsberg & Bonnie Frank Carter eds., 1987).
398. Zamora v. State (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1979).
399. Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 778.
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that Zamora acted under a state of pseudo-intoxication resulting from
watching hours of violent television programs which, in turn, drove the
boy to kill the woman.4"' The trial court refused to allow testimony on
television intoxication, finding it to be irrelevant to the question of
Zamora's insanity.401
Media intoxication, however, could meet with more success in the
diminished capacity realm, although to date, such attempts have been
generally unsuccessful. In a provocative article, Patricia Falk reviewed the
extensive body of literature addressing the nature and effects of media
intoxication and addiction.4 2 She noted: "[t]he primary, and almost
unanimous, finding common to this extensive body of research is that a
positive correlation exists between viewing violent television programs
and subsequent aggressive behavior."4 3 Similar research findings have
linked violence against women to the viewing of pornography.40 4 Serial
killer Bobby Joe Long asserted in the sentencing phase of his murder trial
that his addiction to violent pornography should have constituted a
mitigating factor against the death penalty.40 This argument was rejected
by the jury and he was sentenced him to death.40 6
In Schiro v. Clark,40 7 the defendant "argued that he was a sexual sadist
and that his extensive viewing of rape pornography and snuff films
rendered him unable to distinguish right from wrong." ' 8 The defendant
produced the testimony of two leading experts on the link between
violence and pornography and sought to have it used as evidence of
insanity and as a type of intoxication which the applicable state law
recognized as a mitigating factor. 4°9 The defendant was convicted and his

400. Id. at 778-79.
401. Id. at 780-81. In State v. Quillen, the Court specifically stated that evidence of television
intoxication did not support a plea of insanity. See also Falk, supra note 282, at 745 (citing State
v. Quillen, No. S-87-08-0118, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 129 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1989)); see
also State v. Molina, No. 84-2314B (11 th Judicial Dist., Fla. 1984) (discussed in Juliet Lughbough
Dee, Media Accountabilityfor Real-Life Violence: A Case of Negligence or Free Speech?, 37 J.
COMM. 106 (1987)).
402. Falk, supra note 282, at 758-81.
403. Id. at 767.
404. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OFTHE STATE 195214 (1989); see Ron Hayes, Attorney Knows How to Represent Himself,CHl. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1991,
at Cl.
405. Hayes, supranote 404, at Cl.
406. Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Long v.
State, 610 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1992).
407. Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
408. Id. at 971.
409. Id. at971-72.
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subsequent appeals were all denied on the rationale that allowing a
criminal defense based on exposure to materials protected by the First
Amendment would be incongruous.41° Similar reasoning resulted in the
unsuccessful assertion of an analogous argument using music lyrics in the
case of Ronald Ray Howard. 41' The nineteen-year-old defendant killed a
police officer and sought to avoid the death penalty by arguing that his
addiction to "gangsta rap" was a mitigating factor. 12 The argument was
rejected by the jury who sentenced Howard to death.413
The link between violence depicted in different media forms and actual
violence will continue to be an important part of expert testimony in both
civil and criminal cases. Whether media intoxication is eventually is
accepted as a form or either diminished capacity or diminished
responsibility remains to be seen. Either way, defense attorneys will
undoubtedly call upon forensic mental health clinicians to assess
defendants who assert the defense in guilt and sentencing phases of
criminal trials.
F. Summary of Diminished CapacityEvidence
Part III should make clear that criminal defendants have attempted to
expand the notion of diminished capacity into a multitude of defenses with
varying degrees of success. Diminished capacity arguments based on bona
fide mental illnesses that interfere with sensation, perception, and
cognition tend to fare well. In contrast, attempts to cast defendants as less
culpable because they were victims of abuse or neglect generally do not
succeed.4 14 This ever-increasing trend towards disease-based explanations
for criminal behavior has clearly taken a toll on public attitudes towards
excuse defenses based on mental illness.415 While defendants and their

410. Id.

411. Falk, supra note 282, at 747-48 (citing Michele Munn, Note, The Effects ofFreeSpeech:
Mass Communication Theory andthe CriminalPunishmentofSpeech, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 433,47678 (1994); Janet Elliott, Slain Trooper'sFamily Seeks Damages From Rapper:Round2 in Gangsta
Rap Case, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at 10; Chuck Phillips, Rap Defense Doesn't Stop Death
Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at F1; Pamela Ward & Scott W. Wright, Howard Gets Death
Sentence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 15, 1993, at B1).

412. Ward & Wright, supra note 411, at Bl.
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing andPunishingin CriminalAdjudication:A Reality
Check, 5 CORNELL J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 1 (1995); Stephanie B. Goldberg, FaultLines, 80 A.B.A. J.,
40(1994).
415. ALAN M. DERSHOWiTZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND

EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT (1997).
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lawyers who seek to avoid punishment are partially to blame, behavioral
scientists also share in the responsibility for this trend.
"The abuse excuse," "battered woman syndrome," "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome," "false memory syndrome," "television
intoxication," "urban survival syndrome," "XYY chromosome
abnormality"--"these are just a few of the colorful appellations used to
describe claims that mental health professionals have bolstered with their
testimony over the years.'416 "From reading the popular press, one could
easily come to the conclusion that such testimony is spurious
'psychobabble' that will eventually swallow up our justice system.""'7
An overwhelming number of psychologists and psychiatrists do not
take part in sensational trials that attempt to extend diminished capacity
into the realm of questionable scientific practice."' Media attention on the
few cases that are the exception to this rule, however, has had real and
palpable effects on the jurisprudence of defenses of excuse."' 9 The
perception that these defenses undermine legal notions of autonomy, freewill, and personal responsibility has led legislatures, judges, and juries to
"define the grounds of excuse too narrowly.""'2 The abolition of the
insanity defense in favor of the mens rea approach is one of the best
examples of the efforts to narrow legitimate criminal excuse. Other
examples include the move towards "guilty except insane" formulations
of the insanity defense and the elimination of diminished capacity
evidence altogether, even when offered to challenge the defendant's
alleged formation of mens rea."2 '
Sadly, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Clark upheld this
last approach over a schizophrenic defendant's due process challenge."22
While Part V of this Article is devoted to critiquing the decision in that
case, the true tragedy of Arizona v. Clark lies in the majority's distrust of
forensic psychiatric and psychological evidence and the effects that

416. Christopher Slobogin, PsychiatricEvidence in CriminalTrials: To Junk orNot to Junk?,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,1-2 (1998).
417. Id. at 2.
418. Id. at 7.
419. Id. at 2 n.9 (citing, inter alia, Niko Price, The "Abuse Excuse": Threat to Justice?;More
and More Lawyers Using Trauma as Defense to Crimes, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1994,

at 3 (referring to "two decades of pop psychology and afternoon talk shows that have convinced
society... that there is an explanation-and possibly a justification-for almost any act").
420. Donald A. Dripps, FundamentalRetribution Error: CriminalJustice and the Social
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1389 (2003).
421. See, e.g., State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997),
holding reaffid by Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
422. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
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mistrust caused not only to the defendant in that case, but also to our
notions of criminal responsibility. The Court's distrust of forensic
psychiatric and psychological evidence is no doubt due, in part, to the
behavioral sciences' complicity in supporting empirically and clinically
questionable criminal defenses that seek to displace responsibility from a
criminal actor onto a victim or society at large. 23
V. ARIZONA v. CLARK

A. FactualBackground
In the summer of 2000, seventeen-year-old Eric Clark killed a police
officer in the line of duty.424 Clark had been driving his pickup truck
around a residential neighborhood with the radio "blaring" loud music.425
A police officer pulled-over Clark's truck in response to complaints.426
Less than a minute after having approached Clark and having told him to
"stay where he was," Clark shot the officer and ran away.42 7 Before he
died, the officer contacted the police dispatcher to help. Clark was
apprehended later that day "with gunpowder residue on his hands. 428 The
gun used to kill the officer was subsequently found close to where Clark
had been arrested.429

423. See generally Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of FederalJudicial Views of the
Social Science "Researcher'sBlack Arts," 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 169 (2003).
Abuse excuses run counter to retributive and deterrence based sentencing ideals.
Testimony of sociologists and psychologists in particular that seek to justify
criminal behavior or mitigate its seriousness on the basis of diminished capacity,
other than that stemming from a bona-fide DSM-IV Axis I mental disorder, serves
to alienate judges (and perhaps juries) from these disciplines. Moreover, since
these excuses are premised on a deterministic view of human nature (i.e.,
something in someone's past caused someone to break the law), it is at odds with
the law's assumption that behavior is a product of free will.
Id.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at2716.
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At Clark's trial, friends, family, classmates, and school officials all
testified about his "increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the
shooting.""43
Witnesses testified, for example, that paranoid delusions led Clark
to rig a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at home to alert
him to intrusion by invaders, and to keep a bird in his automobile
to warn of airborne poison. There was lay and expert testimony that
Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with "aliens" (some
impersonating government agents), the "aliens" were trying to kill
him, and bullets were the only way to stop them. A psychiatrist
testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with
delusions about "aliens" when he killed Officer Moritz, and he
concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or
understanding right from wrong and that he was thus insane at the
time of the killing. In rebuttal, a psychiatrist for the State gave his
opinion that Clark's paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from
appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct, as shown by his
actions before and after the shooting (such as circling the residential
block with music blaring as if to lure the police to intervene,
" '
evading the police after the shooting, and hiding the gun).43
Although the trial court determined that Clark "was indisputably afflicted
with paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shooting," it found him
guilty nonetheless, concluding that his mental illness "did not... distort
his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were
wrong."432 Clark, however, was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in
prison.433 His attorney then moved to vacate the judgment and sentence on
the grounds that both the exclusion of psychiatric evidence to disprove
mens rea and Arizona's narrow formulation of the insanity defense both
violated his due process rights.4 34 The trial court denied this motion; the
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished disposition; and the
Arizona Supreme Court denied discretionary review.4 35 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted Clark's petition for certiorari on two separate due process
issues, each of which will now be separately explored.

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

Id.at 2717.
Id. at 2717-18.
Id. at 2718.
Id.
Clark, 126 S.C. at 2718.
Id.
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B. Issue 1: The Narrowing of M'Naghten
Clark asserted that Arizona's GEL formulation of the insanity defense
violated due process because it lacked the first prong of the M'Naghten
test, which evaluated the cognitive capacity to know the nature and quality
of one's acts.43 6 While Arizona had used the true M'Naghten test in the
past, the state omitted inclusion of the cognitive incapacity prong when it
enacted its GEl formulation.437 It appears, however, that the statutory
change was not intended to alter substantively the test for insanity, but
rather that the state legislature determined that "a streamlined standard
' 438
with only the moral capacity part would be easier for the jury to apply.
Clark argued that the new statutory language deprived him of his due
process rights because the M'Naghten test for insanity represented a
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."439 Indeed, such an argument had
worked before the Nevada Supreme Court in Fingerv. State,"4 although
it had been rejected in Utah, Idaho, and Montana. 4" The U.S. Supreme
Court sided with the weight of state authority on the issue. The Court
dismissed Clark's fundamental right argument outright, stating that
"[h]istory shows no deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula
to the level of fundamental principle, so as to limit the traditional
recognition of a State's capacity to define crimes and defenses." 42 In
support of this conclusion, the Court pointed to the many variations in the

436. Id.
437. Id. at 2719 (citing 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 256, §§ 2-3).
438. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at2723 (citing Ariz. House of Rep. Judiciary Comm. notes 3 (Mar. 18,
1993); 1 R. GERBER, CRIMINAL LAW OF ARIZONA 502-11 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2000)).
439. Id. at 2737 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
440. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001).
[R]ecognition of insanity as a defense is a core principle that has been recognized
for centuries by every civilized system of law in one form or another. Historically,
the defense has been formulated differently, but given the extent of knowledge
concerning principles of human nature at any given point in time, the essence of
the defense, however formulated, has been that a defendant must have the mental
capacity to know the nature of his act and that it was wrong.
Id.(quoting State v. Herrera, 845 P.2d 359, 372 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
441. Herrera,895 P.2d at 365-66; State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990); State v.
Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984).
442. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2719.
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insanity defense discussed above." 3 States are therefore free to define
insanity as they see fit without running afoul the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4'
While seemingly unnecessary to do so, the Court took issue with
Clark's underlying logic, noting that in practice, the cognitive incapacity
prong of the M'Naghten test and its moral incapacity prong are
intertwined:
[C]ognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral
incapacity. Cognitive incapacity, in other words, is a sufficient
condition for establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a
necessary one. As a defendant can therefore make out moral
incapacity by demonstrating cognitive incapacity, evidence bearing
on whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his actions
is both relevant and admissible. In practical terms, if a defendant
did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could not have
known that he was performing the wrongful act charged as a
crime." 5
Accordingly, the Court felt that the first prong of the M'Naghten test
somewhat duplicated the second prong, and therefore, the statutory
omission of the cognitive incapacity test had little, if any, effect on the
overall fairness of an insanity case." 6
C. Issue 2: Due Process Challenge to Arizona 's Mott Rule
The second of Clark's due process challenges concerned the rule set
forth by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Mott."7 Mott involved the
conviction of a woman for "child abuse under circumstances likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury" for the murder of her daughter." 8
The mother knew that her daughter was being physically abused by her
boyfriend; yet, she not only failed to remove her daughter from the
abusive environment, but also she failed to take her daughter for necessary
medical care after her boyfriend severely injured her daughter.44 9 At her
trial, the mother sought to introduce evidence through expert testimony
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2722.
Id. at 2723-24.
State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1054-55 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1048-49.
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that she lacked the capacity to have acted to save her daughter because her
own mental status was significantly impaired due to the Battered Woman
Syndrome.45 ° The defense tried to use such evidence to rebut the
prosecution's argument that the child abuse via omission had been either
purposeful or knowing within the meaning of these terms as mens rea for
criminal liability.451 The trial court refused to allow such evidence,
however, ruling that "the testimony regarding the battered-woman
syndrome was an attempt to establish a diminished capacity defense" that
was inadmissible under Arizona law.45 2 The defendant was convicted and
appealed.453 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "trial
court's preclusion of defendant's proffered testimony regarding batteredwoman syndrome violated due process."454 The Arizona Supreme Court
vacated the decision of the intermediate appellate court and reinstated the
defendant's conviction and sentence.455 The Court reasoned that the
proffered expert testimony was, in fact, diminished capacity evidence that
was inadmissible because "Arizona does not allow evidence of a
defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative
defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime."" 6 But, the Mott
court's board holding was not required by state law. The Mott court could
have strictly interpreted the state legislature's failure to adopt a diminished
capacity defense as a limitation on using diminished capacity as an
affirmative defense457 without having barred the admissibility of
psychological testimony shy of insanity to negate mens rea."58 The dissent

450. Id.at 1049.
451. Id.
452. Mott, 931 P.2d at 1049.
453. Id.
454. Id. (citing State v. Mott, 901 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)).
455. Id.at 1057.
456. Id. at 1051 (citing A.R.S. § 13-502(A)).
457. See, e.g., Mott, 931 P.2d at 1050 ("the Arizona legislature... Declined to adopt the
defense of diminished capacity when presented with the opportunity to do so."); see also State v.
Schantz, 403 P.2d 521,529 (Ariz. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015 (1966) (refusing tojudiciallyrecognize the diminished capacity defense on the grounds that the legislature is responsible for
promulgating the criminal law and that it "ha[d] not recognized a disease or defect of mind in which
volition does not exist... as a defense to a prosecution for [a crime]").
458. See Mott, 931 P.2d at 1058 (Zlacket, C.J., concurring).
I am unprepared to agree that expert testimony must be strictly limited to
M'Naghten insanity under all circumstances in any and every case, or that
psychological evidence tending to negate an essential element of the crime
charged can never be admitted. Such an expansive holding seems both unwise and
unnecessary.
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in Mott explained this critical distinction as follows:
The evidence of defendant's history of being battered and of her
limited intellectual ability was.., offered.., as evidence to negate
the mens rea element of the crime. The majority further
acknowledges that "[s]uch evidence is distinguishable from an
affirmative defense that excuses, mitigates, or lessens a defendant's
moral culpability due to his psychological impairment." Yet,
despite recognizing this distinction, the majority takes the
inconsistent position that use of psychiatric evidence to negate
mens rea is the same as an attempt to prove diminished capacity."'
The result in Mott is interpreted as barring the admissibility of all
evidence of mental illness to disprove mens rea if not offered as part and
parcel of an insanity defense.46 ° The Mott rule thus prevented the
defendant in Mott from arguing that she did not entertain the requisite
mens rea for child abuse and murder in the same way that the Mott rule's
reach prevented Eric Clark from introducing evidence tending to show that
he did not entertain the mens rea for murder.46 1
In spite of Mott's significant impingement on the criminal defendant's
ability to demonstrate that his mental illness interfered with the ability to
form a culpable mens rea, Clark upheld Mott's limitation on diminished
capacity evidence over Clark's due process challenge. 62
The Supreme Court felt that resolution of Clark's challenge to the
constitutionality of Mott required an exploration of three categories of
evidence that affect mens rea within the Mott framework. The first of these
categories was termed "observational evidence" by the Court. 463 This
category of evidence concerns the observations of experts and laypersons
alike regarding someone's behavior-what someone said, how they
behaved, their "tendency to think in a certain way., 464 Such evidence may
be offered to support a clinical diagnosis or as evidence of an actor's state
of mind at the time of the commission of an offense. 465 The testimony of
Clark's family and schoolmates about his bizarre behavior in the year

Id.
459. Id. at 1061 (Feldman, J.,dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

460. Id. at 1054.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id.
Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2737 (2006).
Id. at 2724.
Id.
Id.
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leading up to the shooting falls under this category of evidence.166 The
second type of relevant proof of mens rea is "mental disease
evidence"-opinion testimony, usually by a qualified expert based on
clinical assessment, that an actor fits the criteria for a particular mental
illness diagnosis. 467 The testimony of mental health professionals stating
that Clark suffered from paranoid schizophrenia is an example of such
evidence.468
The third subtype of evidence the Supreme Court felt was relevant to
prove mens rea is "capacity evidence"--that which demonstrates a
"defendant's capacity for cognition and moral judgment (and ultimately
also his capacity to form mens rea). 4 69 The Court explained that such
evidence, like mental disease evidence, is usually offered in the form of
expert opinion testimony.47 ° In Clark, the mental health experts proffered
by the defense opined that Clark lacked the capacity to know his actions
were wrong, while the opinions of the prosecution's experts were that
Clark had such capacity in spite of his psychotic state.47'
The Court's tripartite evidentiary structure in Clark does not appear
anywhere in Mott. Moreover, the "razor-thin distinction[s]" drawn by the
Court did not get to the crux of Clark's due process challenge.472 Mott's
holding was not restricted to mental disease evidence. The Arizona
Supreme Court did not refer to any distinction between observation and
mental disease evidence or lay and expert testimony. Its holding was stated
in broad terms: "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental

466. See id at 2717-18.
467. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2725.
468. Seeid. at 2717-18.
469. Id. at 2725.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 2725. It should be noted that although Arizona permits testimony on capacity
evidence as defined by the Supreme Court, many jurisdictions do not allow testimony on the
"ultimate issue" to be decided in a case. See ARIz. R. EVD. 704 (allowing otherwise admissible
evidence on testimony "embrac[ing] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."). But see,
e.g., FED. R. EvtD. 704(b).
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the
trier of fact alone.
Id.
472. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2741 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the
mens rea element of a crime.""
It was precisely the exclusion of mental illness evidence from being
used to determine whether Clark had acted with the requisite underlying
mens rea of purpose or knowledge that formed the basis of his second due
process challenge. His defense at trial centered on his diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia.474 Separate and apart from whether this
debilitating psychotic disorder rendered him legally insane, he asserted
that his mental illness made him delusional. 4" Of particular relevance was
his belief that governmental workers, including municipal personnel in
Flagstaff like Officer Moritz, were aliens.4 76 If he delusionally thought
Officer Mortiz was an alien, and not a police officer, then he did not
"knowingly" shoot another human being, much less knowingly shoot an
officer of the law.4 77 He would therefore not be guilty under the Arizona
first-degree murder statute, an important point that the majority failed to
comprehend.
The Court seems to have unnecessarily created its own narrow
the way Mott distinguished
evidentiary scheme based upon its reading 4of
78
another Arizona case, State v. Christensen:
Christensen is distinguishable from the present case because the
evidence offered by the defendant in that case was not evidence of
his diminished mental capacity. Rather, the defendant merely
offered evidence about his behavioral tendencies. He attempted to
show that he possessed a character trait of acting reflexively in
response to stress. The proffered testimony was not that he was
incapable, by reason of a mental defect, of premeditating or
deliberating but that, because he had a tendency to act impulsively,
he did not premeditate the homicide. Because he was not offering
evidence of his diminished capacity, but only of a character trait
relating to his lack of premeditation, the defendant was not
precluded from presenting the expert testimony.479
evidences its
473. Id. (quoting Mott, 931 P.2d, at 1051 ("The legislature's decision ..
rejection of the use of psychological testimony to challenge the mens rea element of a crime.")
(omission in original)).
474. Id. at 2716.
475. Id. at 2717. Part of his delusional belief system was that his town was inhabited by aliens.
Id.
476. Id. at 2717, 2724-25.
477. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2743.
478. State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 583-84 (Ariz. 1981).
479. Mott, 931 P.2d at 1054.
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The distinction made by the Mott court was plainly wrong. Evidence of a
"character trait" that causes someone's "behavioral tendencies" to act
impulsively is diminished capacity evidence. Such a "character trait" is
part and parcel of an impulse control disorder, defined as "the failure to
resist an impulse, drive, 48
or0 temptation to perform an act that is harmful to
the person or to others.
In fact, testimony concerning "character traits" and "behavioral
tendencies" may well fall under the Clark majority's definition of
"observational evidence," because labeling such traits and behaviors with
the appropriate clinical diagnosis would be "mental disease evidence"
under Clark's evidentiary rubric. The admissibility of the evidence,
however, should not turn on such a definitional distinction, as both work
together to help jurors understand human behavior. Regardless of the
definitional label, nothing changes the fact that both the observed
behaviors and the diagnosis which flows from them are, in fact, evidence
of diminished capacity as attested to by the facts of Christensen.48 1
In Christensen, the defendant's impulse control disorder led him to
commit a murder under stress.482 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because he was not permitted to offer the testimony
of a psychologist that his killing
under stressful circumstances was more
"reflexive" than "reflective. ' '483 The outcome in Christensen is surprising,
since impulse control disorders, both historically and today, do not qualify
as the basis for excusing criminal conduct.484 In fact, several years after the
Christensendecision, Arizona changed its insanity statutes to specifically
exclude impulse control disorders as qualifying mental diseases or defects
for insanity defense purposes,4 85 a change not mentioned in Mott or Clark.
Thus, the fact that Mott relied upon Christensen is somewhat befuddling.
Moreover, like the defendant in Christensen, the defendant in Mott
offered diminished capacity evidence not as an affirmative defense, but as
evidence to negate mens rea. Yet, such evidence was permitted in
Christensen and not in Mott, apparently because the Arizona Supreme
Court simply decided not to label the evidence proffered by the defense in

480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
disorders
character

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 663.
Christensen, 628 P.2d at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
See supra Part III.A; infra Part IV.D.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (1997) ("Mental disease or defect does not include
that result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs,
defects, psychosexual disorders or impulse control disorders.").
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Christensen diminished capacity evidence, while it decided that the
evidence proffered in Mott was diminished capacity evidence.
Specifically, the defendant in Mott sought to introduce BWS evidence, not
to excuse her conduct, but to show that she did not neglect her children
knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal negligence.486
The inconsistency in Christensenand Mott appears to be due, in part,
to the confusing nature of diminished capacity evidence. Some
jurisdictions permit diminished capacity to be an affirmative defense,
which excuses a defendant's conduct based on mental incapacity that does
not rise to the level of insanity.487 Other jurisdictions, like Arizona, do not
recognize diminished capacity as its own affirmative defense.488
Regardless of whether diminished capacity evidence is accepted as a
complete or partial defense of excuse, the separate factual question of
whether a defendant actually entertained a particular level of mens rea
necessary for a criminal conviction may well depend on whether the
defendant's mental illness interfered with his or her ability to act with the
requisite mens rea. The dissent in Mot 4 89 and Justice Kennedy's dissent
in Clarkboth make this distinction clear.49° The majority opinions in both
cases, however, conflate the issue.
Mott's flawed understanding of both the psychological evidence at
issue in Christensen and the nature of diminished capacity evidence
486. The defense in Mott wanted its expert to address the personality and character traits
shared by women who suffer from domestic violence, and show how these could lead someone in
the defendant's position to fail unintentionally to take action to protect her children from her
boyfriend who physically abused both her and her children. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050
(Ariz. 1997). She was denied the ability to do so. Id.
487. See infra Part IV.C.
488. See, e.g., State v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (Ariz. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015
(1966) (refusing to judicially-recognize the diminished capacity defense on the grounds that the
legislature is responsible for promulgating the criminal law and that it "ha[d] not recognized a
disease or defect of mind in which volition does not exist.., as a defense to a prosecution for [a
crime.]").
489. Mott, 931 P.2d at 1060, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
[W]e deal here with evidence "not offered as a defense to excuse [Defendant's]
crimes, but rather [with] evidence to negate the mens rea element of the crime."
In other words, the evidence was offered to help the jury determine whether
Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence-the only real issues in the case.
Id.
490. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2738-39, 2747 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Criminal responsibility involves an inquiry into whether the defendant knew right from wrong,
not whether he had the mens rea elements of the offense.").
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notwithstanding, the Supreme Court's reliance on Mott's interpretation of
Christensen is still problematic. Assuming, arguendo,that the "character
trait" at issue in Christensen did not concern "mental disease evidence"
(which it did), using Mott's reasoning, the outcome of Clark should still
be different. The Mott court accepted that the defendant in Christensen
was offering evidence of his inability to control his impulses as evidence
that he did not entertain the requisite mens rea for murder. Specifically, the
Christensencourt held that denying the defendant the ability to argue that
his mental status interfered with his ability to act deliberately or with
premeditation violated due process.49 ' Why, then, was Eric Clark denied
the ability to argue that his mental status interfered with his ability to act
knowingly? This inconsistency is exacerbated by the fact that the
defendant in Christensen was not psychotic, and Eric Clark was.
Accordingly, Clark had a much stronger case for demonstrating why his
mental illness interfered with his ability to form mens rea than did the
defendant in Christensen.
The U.S. Supreme Court should have discerned the inconsistencies in
Mott and Christensen. It did not. It accepted Mott as settled state law
without regard to the due process arguments that Eric Clark advanced.
Moreover, the majority in Clark distilled a triad of types of evidence
tending to establish mens rea from the illogical web of strained reasoning
evidenced in both Christensen and Mott. These evidentiary distinctions
were unnecessary. Moreover, they are so misleading that Justice Kennedy
called them an
"evidentiary framework that ... will be unworkable in
49 2
many cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court is undoubtedly correct that laymen and
experts alike have insights into a person's behavior, especially when it is
bizarre, and therefore, their testimony concerning their personal
observations of a defendant's behavior is both relevant and admissible.493
Presumably, this led the Court to interpret Mott as having no effect on
"observational evidence" regardless of whether it was offered by a
layperson or a qualified expert.494 In contrast, the Court viewed Mott as
limiting expert testimony with regard to both "mental disease evidence"
and "capacity evidence."4' 95 But mental disease evidence is not a distinct
construct from either observational evidence or capacity evidence.

491. Christensen, 628 P.2d at 584 ("[I]t is inconsistent with fundamental justice to prevent a
defendant from offering evidence to dispute the charge against him.").
492. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
493. See, e.g., State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280, 284 (Ariz. 1986).
494. Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2726.
495. Id.
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Forensic clinical assessment involves not only the administration of
cognitive and personality tests, but also observations of human behavior. 96
Moreover, a person's capacity to understand right from wrong is
dependent not only upon a particular diagnosis, but also on how the
disorder manifests itself in a given person, something deduced from
observation of the patient. Thus, the Court's evidentiary triad creates a
false trichotomy, as all three types of evidence are intertwined with each
other. Justice Kennedy points out this truism in his dissent:
The mental-disease evidence at trial was also intertwined with the
observation evidence because it lent needed credibility. Clark's
parents and friends testified Clark thought the people in his town
were aliens trying to kill him. These claims might not be believable
without a psychiatrist confirming the story based on his experience
with people who have exhibited similar behaviors. It makes little
sense to divorce the observation evidence from the explanation that
makes it comprehensible. 97
Having unnecessarily created these three confusing and misleading
categories of behavioral evidence, the Court construed Clark's due process
challenge to Mott as being one limited to its prohibition on mental disease
evidence from being used to establish diminished capacity.498 The Court
held that such a prohibition does not violate due process. 499 But, the
majority is wrong on two counts. Not only did Clark argue that barring
diminished capacity evidence was a due process violation, but he also
argued that, even if it were constitutionally permissible to bar diminished
capacity evidence, it would nonetheless be unconstitutional to apply that
rule in a manner that prohibited a criminal defendant from attempting to
prove that he lacked mens rea.5 °° Thus, by construing Clark's claim so
narrowly, the majority missed the gravamen of his second issue. To
compound matters, the majority's substantive holding on its narrow
interpretation of Clark's challenge to Mott is critically flawed for a number
of other reasons. Justice Souter's opinion offers several bases for the
Court's upholding of the Mott rule. All of them are related to the possible
effects of confusion over mental illness expert testimony. First, the Court

496. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT: AN
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH (1991).
497.
498.
499.
500.

Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2739 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2729 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2737.
Id. at 2739 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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reasoned that by confining such evidence to the ultimate question of
insanity, it preserves the full force of a state's allocation of the burden of
persuasion to overcome the presumption of sanity. °1
[T]he presumption of sanity would then be only as strong as the
evidence a factfinder would accept as enough to raise a reasonable
doubt about mens rea for the crime charged; once reasonable doubt
was found, acquittal would be required, and the standards
established for the defense of insanity would go by the boards.
Now, a State is of course free to accept such a possibility in its law.
After all, it is free to define the insanity defense by treating the
presumption of sanity as a bursting bubble, whose disappearance
shifts the burden to the prosecution to prove sanity whenever a
defendant presents any credible evidence of mental disease or
incapacity. In States with this kind of insanity rule, the legislature
may well be willing to allow such evidence to be considered on the
mens rea element for whatever the factfinder thinks it is worth.
What counts for due process, however, is simply that a State that
wishes to avoid a second avenue for exploring capacity, less
stringent for a defendant, has a good reason for confining the
consideration of evidence of mental disease and incapacity to the
insanity defense. °2
Thus, when a state makes a policy judgment-as Arizona, many other
states, and the federal government have done-to place the burden on a
defendant to prove his insanity by clear and convincing evidence, allowing
expert testimony on the defendant's mental illness could usurp that
allocation of the burden of persuasion by allowing such evidence to cast
reasonable doubt on the defendant's mens rea. The practical effect of the
Court's reasoning is two-fold. First, it reaffirms the right of any U.S.
jurisdiction to refuse to allow a defendant to introduce diminished capacity
evidence.5" 3 Second, as Justice Kennedy's dissent makes clear, it undercuts
the basic principle of due process that the prosecution must prove mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The insanity defense merely allows the law to excuse the criminal
conduct of someone who commits a criminal act due to significant mental

501. Id. at 2732 (majority opinion).
502. Id. at 2732-33.
503. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2733 (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 466-76 (1946)
(upholding a refusal to instruct a jury that it could consider the defendant's mental deficiencies,
which did not rise to the level of insanity, in determining the elements of premeditation)).
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impairment. Thus, the insanity defense separates "nonblameworthy from
blameworthy offenders." 5" The insanity defense does not, however, have
any effect on a determination of the actor's underlying guilt, a question
which turns on whether the government can prove all elements of a
criminal offense, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt. 5
A defendant, like M'Naghten, may well have formed specific intent to
commit a crime, but did so under morally blameless circumstances as a
result of psychosis. It is an entirely separate question whether a defendant
formed mens rea. The Mott rule, therefore, interferes with a defendant's
fundamental right to present evidence that calls into question whether he
entertained mens rea, an element on which the prosecution bears the
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt.5 °6
While states have latitude to exclude relevant evidence offered by a
criminal defendant, 50 7 they are constrained from doing so when it
interferes with a criminal defendant's "meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense."50 8 The deprivation of Eric Clark's constitutional right
to present a defense as to the element of mens rea was at the heart of his
due process challenge to Mott. Yet, the majority decision in Clark
dismissed this essential point because it found that mental disease or
capacity evidence was efficiently unreliable to warrant a rule of evidence
excluding it in spite of its relevance, much like is done for hearsay
evidence:
While the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence
under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are
disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, wellestablished rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other
factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential
to mislead the jury.50 9

504. Id. at 2731 (citing DONALD H. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL,

HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (1983)).
505. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
361-64 (1970).
506. Cf Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding jury instruction that had
the effect of placing the burden on the defendant to disprove that he had the requisite mental state
violates due process).
507. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
508. Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
509. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732
(2006) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996);
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The Clark Court found that mental disorder evidence and moral
capacity evidence both suffer from sufficient reliability issues and that
Arizona was justified in limiting such evidence exclusively to the question
of insanity.51° In support of this conclusion, the Court made three related
arguments. First, it relied on language in the American Psychiatric
51 '
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
that its diagnostic classifications reflect a "consensus" about mental
disorders at the time of publication that may change as "[n]ew knowledge
generated by research or clinical experience" becomes available.5" 2 The
Court construed the APA's admission that consensus regarding diagnoses
may change over time masked "vigorous debate" within the psychiatric
community.513 While the Court was careful to state that the consequence
of this masking was not to "condemn mental-disease evidence wholesale,"
it concluded that "this professional ferment is a general caution in treating
psychological classifications as predicates for excusing otherwise criminal
conduct."514
Second, the Court cautioned that, even when the diagnostic criteria is
"broadly accepted" and "uncontroversial," mental disease evidence still
has the potential "to mislead jurors" by suggesting "that a defendant
suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks cognitive, moral,
volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound conclusion at
' This, according to the Court, is "because of the imperfect fit
all."515
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information
' But, this is an absurd line of reasoning
contained in a clinical diagnosis."516
since forensic psychological/psychiatric testimony concerning a
defendant's cognitive, moral, or volitional capabilities not only remains
admissible to prove insanity, but also to prove a host of other criminal
competencies ranging from a mentally-ill defendant's competency to stand
trial, competency to waive Mirandarights, to act as his/her own attorney,
to a defendant's competency to be sentenced and punished.517

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
510. Id. at 2734-35.
511. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at xxxiii.
512. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2734 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at xxxiii).
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 2735.
517. See generally HENRY F.FRADELLA, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: THE USE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006); RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (4th ed., West 2004).
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Finally, the Court asserted that there are "particular risks inherent in the
the mental-disease classifications
opinions of the experts who supplement
18
with opinions on incapacity":
Unlike observational evidence bearing on mens rea, capacity
evidence consists ofjudgment, and judgment fraught with multiple
perils: a defendant's state of mind at the crucial moment can be
elusive no matter how conscientious the enquiry, and the law's
categories that set the terms of the capacity judgment are not the
categories of psychology that govern the expert's professional
thinking. . . . And even when an expert is confident that his
understanding of the mind is reliable,judgment addressing the basic
categories of capacity requires a leap from the concepts of
psychology, which are devised for thinking about treatment, to the
concepts of legal sanity, which are devised for thinking about
criminal responsibility.1 9
This argument is not novel. It has been made by courts and scholars
alike insofar as it posits that a mental health professional is no more
qualified than anyone else to decide whether a particular defendant falls
within the legal definition of insanity.5 21 While an arguable position, it
nonetheless misses the point in Clark, as the evidence was not being
restricted in the consideration of insanity; such "ultimate issue" evidence
is permissible under Arizona law. 52 ' Rather, the evidence was being
of establishing mens rea-an
restricted under Mott for the purposes
5 22
entirely different line of analysis.
All three arguments offered by the majority in support of its conclusion
that Arizona may constitutionally limit the introduction of mental disease
evidence and capacity evidence to disprove mens rea collectively
demonstrate a deep distrust of forensic psychiatric and psychological
clinical assessment. Do laypeople understand that clinical depression can

518.
519.
520.
EDWARD

Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2735.
Id. at 2735-36.
Id. at 2736 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at xxxii-xxxiii; PAUL GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, SCiENTIC EVIDENCE § 9-3(B), at 286 (1986); RALPH SLOVENKO,

PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 55 (1995)).

521. State v. Sanchez, 573 P.2d 60, 64 (Ariz. 1977); ARIZ. R. EV. 704 (2006) (allowing
otherwise admissible evidence on testimony "embrac[ing] an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact").
522. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]he
existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or
nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.").
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be so severe as to cause psychotic breaks with reality?5 23 Would the
common juror understand that the auditory hallucinations experienced by
schizophrenics often cause them to play music loudly to drown out the
voices in their heads, something particularly relevant in Clark?24 Who, if
not mental health professionals, are more qualified to give an opinion
regarding whether a particular mental illness interferes with a person's
ability to act with specific intent? Justice Kennedy's dissent makes this
point quite eloquently:
The existence of ... functional psychosis [in this case] is beyond
dispute, but that does not mean the lay witness understands it or
that a disputed issue of fact concerning its effect in a particular
instance is not something for the expert to address. . . . [T]he
opinion that Clark had paranoid schizophrenia-an opinion shared
by experts for both the prosecution and defense-bears on efforts
to determine, as a factual matter, whether he knew he was killing a
police officer. The psychiatrist's explanation of Clark's condition
was essential to understanding how he processes sensory data and
therefore to deciding what information was in his mind at the time
of the shooting. Simply put, knowledge relies on cognition, and
cognition can be affected by schizophrenia.525
Justice Kennedy's assessment is thoughtful and displays an understanding
of the often complicated nuances of human behavior. His point that mental
disease evidence works hand-in-hand with observational evidence
demonstrates why the Court's tripartite evidentiary structure is
nonsensical.
Not being able to offer all relevant evidence of the defendant's inability
to have knowingly killed Officer Mortiz interfered with Clark's due
process right to present evidence that could have cast significant doubt on
the state's ability to meet its burden to prove mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 26 While states are free to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove his own insanity,5 27 the Mott rule has the practical

523. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 83, at 369-76.
524. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2739 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
525. Id.
526. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210-11 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361-64 (1970).
527. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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effect of unconstitutionally placing a burden of disproving mens rea on the
5 28
defendant while simultaneously limiting the defendant's ability to do so.
Having shown why the exclusion of forensic psychiatric and
psychological evidence on the issue of mens rea in Clark was a due
process violation, Justice Kennedy's dissent then takes issue with the
majority's arguments about the propriety of the exclusion of such evidence
due to its potential to mislead or confuse the jury. First, a per se ruling
banning certain types of evidence as unreliable cannot be constitutionally
applied when the evidence at issue "may be reliable in an individual
case."5 29 Arizona has specialized rules of evidence dealing with the
admissibility of expert testimony, including provisions to bar unreliable
or speculative testimony as offered in a particular case.53°
These rules have been held by state courts to allow a variety of types
of psychological evidence to be used in cases varying from "the
psychological characteristics of molestation victims
532

5 31

to "psychiatric

testimony regarding neurological deficits.
Courts across the nation
apply similar rules of evidence to behavioral science testimony with
surprising consistency.533 Thus, having a per se rule against all forms of
528. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2747 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) ("jury
instruction that had the effect of placing the burden on the defendant to disprove that he had the
requisite mental state violates due process")); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972) (per
curiam) (jury instruction that allowed jury to consider accomplice's testimony only if it was true
beyond a reasonable doubt "place[d] an improper burden on the defense and allow[ed] the jury to
convict despite its failure to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
233-34 (1987) (State can shift the burden on a claim of self-defense, but if the jury were disallowed
from considering self-defense evidence for purposes of deciding the elements of the offense, it
"would relieve the State of its burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate")). Arizona
attempted to justify doing so by relying on Montana v. Egelhoff, which upheld Montana's statutory
ban on presenting evidence of voluntary intoxication to rebut mens rea. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37 (1996). But this reliance on Egelhoff is misplaced. Egelhoff chose to become intoxicated;
Clark did not choose to have paranoid schizophrenia. The difference is a critical one, as Egelhoff's
purposeful decision to become intoxicated can serve as the basis of criminal liability, while Clark
is devoid of any responsibility for having a mental state that renders him unable to distinguish
reality from a world filled with delusions and hallucinations. Id.at 44 (citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN, at *32-33 ("the intoxicated defendant 'shall have no privilege by this voluntary
contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses'); 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *25-26 (the law viewed intoxication "as an aggravation of the

offence, rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour")).
529. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2744-45 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
530. Id.at 2745 (citing ARiz. R. EVID. 403, 702 (West 2005)).
531. Id. (citing State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ariz. 1986)).
532. Id.(citing Horan v. Indus. Comm'n, 806 P.2d 911, 914-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).
533. See Fradella et al., supra note 370, at 443 ("First, although critics of Daubert have
suggested that havingjudges evaluating scientific methodologies would lead to inconsistent results,
it appears that inconsistencies are the exceptions, rather than the rule.").
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forensic psychological testimony other than "observational evidence" is
unnecessary.
Moreover, even if it were not unnecessary, a state's interest in
excluding potentially unreliable evidence in courts of law must be
balanced against an individual defendant's due process rights.534 Ironically,
it is observational evidence that is the least scientifically valid and reliable
form of forensic mental health evidence. Consider that the diagnostic
criteria in the DSM-IV-TR-the basis for forming an opinion with regard
to "mental disease evidence"-has been validated to varying degrees,535
while the individual observations of a layperson or a particular clinician
cannot be validated empirically. The Mott rule, therefore, bizarrely allows
"unexplained and uncategorized tendencies to be introduced while
excluding relatively well-understood psychiatric testimony regarding well
'
documented mental illnesses."536
Justice Kennedy's dissent also criticizes the majority's contention that
forensic behavioral science runs too high a risk of jury confusion. He
begins his attack on this faulty premise by noting that "[w]e have always
537
trusted juries to sort through complex facts in various areas of law.
Justice Kennedy concedes that there are numerous psychiatric diagnoses
that might be confusing or misleading to a jury.53 8 The one at issue in
Clark, however, is not one such diagnosis. Schizophrenia "is a welldocumented mental illness, and no one seriously disputes either its
definition or its most prominent clinical manifestations. 5 39 The experts
proffered both by Clark and the prosecution agreed that Clark suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia, and they further agreed that Clark "was
actively psychotic at the time of the killing."54 Kennedy therefore
concludes that if there were any jury confusion issue at all in the case, it
534. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2744 (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2006)
("rule excluding, in certain cases, evidence that a third party may have committed the crime 'even
if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great probative value and even if it would
not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues')); Rock, 483 U.S. at
56 (rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony "operates to the detriment of any defendant
who undergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it took
place, or any independent verification of the information it produced"); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 226 (1967) (rule excluding accomplice testimony "prevent[s] whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief').
535. See generally ALLEN FRANCES ET AL., DSM-IV-TR GUIDEBOOK 3-85 (2004).
536. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 2745 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part)).
538. Id.
539. Id. at 2746.
540. Id.
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was "the result of the Court's own insistence on conflating the insanity
defense and the question of intent."54 ' Considered on its own terms, the
issue of intent and knowledge is a straightforward factual question.
A trier of fact is quite capable of weighing defense testimony and
then determining whether the accused did or did not intend to kill
or knowingly kill a human being who was a police officer. True, the
issue can be difficult to decide in particular instances, but no more
so than many matters juries must confront.542
VII. CONCLUSION

Defining and applying the parameters of diminished capacity evidence
is difficult due to the amorphous nature of the doctrine and its ever
changing boundaries. As defendants have attempted to extend diminished
capacity to cover PMS, media intoxication, and the like, there has clearly
been a corresponding backlash against the use of diminished capacity
evidence. Consider the following commentary:
The acceptance of abuse defenses has transformed America into a
nation of victims. This victimization has led to increased assertions
of novel abuse defenses. America's new culture asserts an
instinctive readiness to blame someone for every misfortune.
Explanations for disadvantages are based on theories of sexism,
racism, illness, rotten childhood, poor education, or anything else
which can project guilt onto others.543
Even when diminished capacity is not extended into the realm of an abuse
excuse, courts still dislike the doctrine. Judicial hostility to diminished
capacity evidence may "reflect the traditional judicial distrust of the
vagaries, uncertainties, and mysteries of psychiatric explanations,
particularly when invoked to assess varying shades of capacity to perform
'
such basic functions as intending and believing."544

541. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at2746.
542. Id.
543. Copp, supra note 351, at 221-22 (citing CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE
DECAY OF AMERICAN CULTURE 11-12 (1992); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 415, at 339).
544. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of CriminalLaw: An OpinionatedReview, 87 CAL. L.

REv. 943,956 (1999).
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In spite of this backlash, diminished capacity receives very little media
coverage unless the case is exceptional." a Outrage over the Hinckley
verdict led to massive curtailment of the insanity defense, yet insanity is
used very rarely and, even when asserted, is unsuccessful nearly threequarters of the time.546 In contrast, the ease with which diminished
capacity can be used in most jurisdictions makes it much more appealing
than insanity, with the added benefit of what ought to be a much higher
likelihood of success.547
We must consider the impact of the continued narrowing of the
insanity defense and our growing reliance on diminished capacity
evidence, whether offered to disprove mens rea or as a mitigating factor
at sentencing.5 48 As the insanity defense grows narrower (or, in some
jurisdictions, nonexistent), there has been a sharp increase in the number
of mentally ill people in prisons. 549 Given how the Clark Court further
limited criminal defendants' ability to argue excuse defenses, there is
every reason to believe the sad trend of increasingly incarcerating mentally
ill people in prisons, rather than hospitals, will continue.
In upholding the overbroad Mott rule, the Clark Court allows states to
severely limit a mentally ill criminal defendant from offering some of the
most probative evidence concerning his or her guilt. To prove that Clark
committed murder, the prosecution in the Clark case introduced evidence
that the defendant spoke of wanting to kill police and then argued that, to
carry out this plan, the defendant lured police to the scene by blaring
music from his truck while circling a block in a residential neighborhood.
The defendant, however, was barred from introducing largely undisputed
evidence about the nature of paranoid schizophrenia and how the disease
caused or could have caused his actions:
For example, as Clark's expert testified during the insanity-defense
phase of his trial, schizophrenics often play music loudly to drown
out the voices in their heads and not to lure police officers to their

545. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
547. But see Neil P. Cohen et al., The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A
PreliminaryStudy, 60 TENN. L. REv. 957,972-73 (1993) (reporting use in only 0.01% of cases with
25% success rate).
548. See, e.g., Gilbert Geis, Pathological Gambling and Insanity, Diminished Capacity,
Dischargeability,and Downward Sentencing Departures,8 GAMING L. REv. 347 (2004).
549. See generally Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the
Incarcerationof Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the
Insanity Defense, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2005).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

cars. But in the first phase of the trial, the judge hearing the case
(Clark waived his right to a jury) couldn't consider that evidence in
deciding whether the prosecution had proved first-degree murder.5 0
One can only hope that since Clark upheld the Mott rule under Arizona
law, the decision will have little impact beyond the State of Arizona. But,
both the language used in Clark and the underlying rationale do not bode
well for the future of defenses of excuse based on mental illness. Indeed,
the decision calls into question the future admissibility of, or weight to be
accorded to, forensic behavioral science evidence. And while that is a
shame since the behavioral sciences have much to offer the law, the real
tragedy concerns Eric Clark and those like him. With such a sorry state of
affairs being the sad reality in present times, mentally ill inmates who do
not belong in prisons will likely continue to burden the correctional
system, inmates who instead should be treated and cared for in secure
mental hospitals. Worse yet, more defendants like Clark may find
themselves in a confusing web of unworkable evidentiary frameworks that
prevent them from arguing what should be a "straightforward defense:
[that they] did not commit the crime with which [they were] charged"
because they lacked the requisite mens rea.55' If that is not a due process
violation, what is?

550. Emily Bazelon, Crazy Law: The Supreme Court Beats Up on the Insanity Defense,
July 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145139.
551. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2749 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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